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9.1 Introduction
Protests against “globalization” involve a wide spectrum of discontents
with modern life and market economies. They include the growth of inter-
national trade and specialization, and the disruptions of traditional or es-
tablished economic practices they entail. They include also the actions of
intergovernmental agencies, such as the International Trade Organization
(ITO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the re-
gional development banks. And it is rare that multinational ﬁrms are not
mentioned, as the presumed leaders and chief beneﬁciaries of globalization.
There are also more speciﬁc accusations against multinationals. Many
evils are alleged. They depress wages and employment at home by moving
production abroad. They depress wages in their host countries by exploit-
ing helpless workers. They stiﬂe host-country growth by displacing local
ﬁrms and obstructing their technological progress. Anyone who believes
that these fears are a new phenomenon should read the chapter on “The
Reactions to Foreign Investment” in Wilkins (1989, chap. 16), where the
author describes how “in the mid-1880s and into the 1890s, a passionate,
hitherto unmatched fury mounted against foreign investment in the United
States” (566).
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ter for Business and Policy Studies, Stockholm, made helpful comments on earlier versions of
this paper.To the extent that opposition to globalization stems from diﬀerent val-
ues that view as bad traditional economic goods such as higher consump-
tion or the growth of production and exchange, I do not attempt to deal
with them. Many of the other accusations are framed in vague terms. I at-
tempt to appraise them by classifying the eﬀects of multinational opera-
tions under several homogeneous headings and reviewing what research
has concluded with respect to each topic. On home-country eﬀects, I sum-
marize the ﬁndings on home-country exports and home-country factor de-
mand. On host-country eﬀects, I discuss wages, productivity, exports, the
introduction of new industries, and the rate of economic growth.
There are two concepts of foreign direct investment (FDI) and two match-
ing ways of measuring it. One is that FDI is a particular form of the ﬂow of
capital across international boundaries. It gives rise to a particular form of
international assets for the home countries, speciﬁcally, the value of hold-
ings in entities, typically corporations, controlled by a home-country resi-
dent or in which a home-country resident holds a certain share of the voting
rights. The other concept of direct investment is that it is a set of economic
activities or operations carried out in a host country by ﬁrms controlled or
partly controlled by ﬁrms in some other (home) country. These activities are,
for example, production, employment, sales, the purchase and use of inter-
mediate goods and ﬁxed capital, and the carrying out of research.
The former of these two concepts is the one reﬂected in balance-of-
payments accounts. The measures of it, ﬂows and stocks of direct invest-
ment, are the only virtually ubiquitous quantitative indicators of FDI.
However, if the eﬀects of FDI stem from the activity of the foreign-owned
ﬁrms in their host countries, the balance-of-payments measures have many
defects for any examination of these impacts. The activity is frequently not
in the same industry as the stock, or not in the same host country, or has
not originated from the same home country (Lipsey 2003; United Nations
2001). For this reason, wherever possible, I emphasize studies based on ac-
tivity, such as production or employment, rather than those based on bal-
ance-of-payments stocks and ﬂows.
9.2 What Happens When a Foreign Direct Investment Is Made?
Much of the earlier economics literature on FDI, but not the business
literature, treated it as a part of the general theory of international capital
movements, based on diﬀerences among countries in the abundance and
cost of capital. If country A makes a direct investment in country B, there
is an addition to the physical capital of country B, and new production ca-
pacity is created there. The investing ﬁrm in A will have chosen to use some
of its capital in B instead of in A. If the output is tradable, some produc-
tion that now takes place in country B may replace production that for-
merly took place in country A. The investing ﬁrm may have reduced its
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plant, and opened up a new plant abroad to serve the same market.
A diﬀerent possibility is that when a ﬁrm in country A makes a direct in-
vestment in country B, the stock of physical capital and the level of pro-
duction are unchanged in both countries. Country A owners and managers
in industry X, using the skills they have acquired in home production, buy
out country B owners with lower skills in that industry and operate the
industry X plants in country B more eﬃciently than before. Country B
owners use their capital, released by the buyout, in other industries. They
might, for instance, lend it to other owners and managers in country B,
skilled in industry Y, to enable them to buy out less competent owners in
that industry in country A. No net movement of physical or ﬁnancial cap-
ital is necessarily implied, although it could take place.
This latter picture belongs to what Markusen (1997) and Markusen and
Maskus (2001) have called the “knowledge-capital model” of the multi-
national enterprise. It is related also to what Caves (1996, chap. 1) refers to
as the dependence of multinational enterprises on “proprietary assets,” or
“ﬁrm-speciﬁc” assets. And it also ﬁts with Romer’s distinction (1993a,b)
between the roles in economic development of what he calls “ideas” in con-
trast to “objects.” Caves (1996) traces the decline of the view that multi-
nationals are principally arbitrageurs of ﬁnancial or physical capital to
Hymer (1960) and to Kindleberger (1969), who adopted many of Hymer’s
ideas. Dunning (1970, 321) summarized their view as being that “the mod-
ern multi-national company is primarily a vehicle for the transfer of entre-
preneurial talent rather than ﬁnancial resources.”
The capital-ﬂow story depends on the advantages of countries as loca-
tions for production, and changes in such advantages. The entrepreneur-
ship story, on the other hand, hinges on characteristics of ﬁrms and their
managers, rather than those of countries. Capital ﬂows imply changes in
the industrial composition of production and employment in home and
host countries. In industries producing tradables, they imply shifts in the
composition of exports and imports. Entrepreneurship explanations con-
tain implications for the ownership of production, but not necessarily for
the location of production.
It is desirable to distinguish the location choices within ﬁrms from the
location choices for industries in the aggregate. If, for example, because of
a decline in communication costs, or an increase in the severity of currency
ﬂuctuations, ﬁrms in all countries decided to diversify their production lo-
cations, each ﬁrm in each country might shift production from home to
foreign locations through FDI. However, there might be no change in the
geographical location of production as a whole, because in each country,
the outward shift of home-country ﬁrms’ production might be balanced by
the inward shift of foreign ﬁrms’ production. Or there could be a general
shift of production toward markets in each industry.
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might be a change in factor prices, such as a rise in the home-country price
of labor, or a rise in the home-country price of a natural resource. In that
case, we would expect a shift in the production of labor-intensive or re-
source-intensive goods away from the home country, both within ﬁrms and
in the aggregate. That might be reﬂected in a decline in ﬁrm and home-
country exports, but it might also be the case that it was the decline of
home-country exports, or the expectation of such a decline, that precipi-
tated the production shift. It is diﬃcult to distinguish between trade shifts
produced by exogenous production-location decisions and location shifts
produced by exogenous shifts, or potential shifts in trade. The diﬃculty of
that distinction has haunted most analyses of home-country impacts.
There is some indication that the exchange of ownership has become a
larger part of FDI ﬂows over time and particularly during the 1990s. One
piece of evidence is that the value of mergers and acquisitions has risen rel-
ative to the value of FDI ﬂows and relative to world output (United Na-
tions [UN] 2000, chap. 4). Most of this merger and acquisition activity has
taken place among the developed countries. The rising trend seems to re-
ﬂect an increase in mergers and acquisitions in general, rather than one
mainly in international, or cross-border, ones: the international share ap-
pears to have been relatively constant since the late 1980s (UN 107). Much
of this activity has taken the form of exchanges of stock, where relatively
little net capital ﬂow is involved.
There are important policy issues behind the strong interest in eﬀects of
the internationalization of production. Should countries promote or dis-
courage the internationalization of their home-country ﬁrms, or should
policy be neutral? Should countries encourage the entrance of foreign pro-
ducers, or discourage it, or leave the decisions to market forces? Some of
the early studies of U.S. direct investment abroad were motivated by the be-
lief that features of the U.S. taxation of corporations were important in-
ducements to foreign investment. That question may not have been settled,
but the spread of the practice of internationalization from ﬁrms based in
the United States to those from many other countries suggests that there
were forces beyond any distortionary U.S. tax policies that were driving
these trends.
9.3 Home-Country Eﬀects of Outward Foreign Direct Investment
9.3.1 Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Home-Country Exports
Since the United States was the dominant outward direct investor in the
period after World War II, much of the debate about the home-country
consequences of FDI took place ﬁrst there. The debate over the possible
substitution of U.S. ﬁrms’ foreign production for U.S. exports was most in-
tense during the time of worries about the balance of payments during the
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(1938) and Madden, Nadler, and Sauvain (1937), did not take up the ex-
port substitution issue, despite the high unemployment levels of the 1930s.
In the 1960s, there was a campaign against outward investment, largely fu-
eled by fears about eﬀects on U.S. exports and, presumably, domestic em-
ployment, that was supported by labor unions and culminated in the un-
successful attempt to pass the Burke-Hartke bill.
The controversies of this period spawned a series of studies relating
outward FDI to home-country exports. There are a number of diﬀerent
questions that can be asked, and they have not always been clearly dis-
tinguished, although the implications of the answers to them diﬀer
considerably. One set of questions is about the relationships within the in-
dividual investing ﬁrm. One is about the relation, for an individual parent
ﬁrm, between its production in a host country and its exports to that coun-
try. A second is about the relation of a ﬁrm’s production in a country to its
exports to the world, taking account of the possibility that aﬃliate exports
to other countries might aﬀect parent markets there. A third is about the
relation between a ﬁrm’s production in all foreign countries and its exports
to the world, taking account of all interrelationships between production
abroad and exports. All of these are issues of ﬁrm strategy: how a ﬁrm
chooses to serve markets around the world. There are no necessary infer-
ences to be drawn about eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s home country as a whole,
without knowledge about how other ﬁrms in the home country or other
countries respond or react to the same stimuli.
A second set of questions is about the relation of the aggregate of deci-
sions by a country’s ﬁrms about production abroad to home-country ex-
ports in the same industry or in the aggregate, or to a home-country or
industry employment or employment of diﬀerent types of labor. These
aggregate decisions incorporate the reactions of one ﬁrm in a country to
the actions of other ﬁrms.
A third set of questions is about the relation between the decisions on the
location of production made by ﬁrms from all countries on the worldwide
pattern of production, trade, and employment, or on any particular coun-
tries’ position. One reason these questions are rarely asked is that little
is known about the outward FDI activities of about half or more of the
world’s direct investors, because most countries do not inquire into what
their ﬁrms do outside their countries’ borders.
The basic problem with studies of these questions has always been the
close connection between the factors that determine a ﬁrm’s exports and
those that determine its foreign direct investment. A country’s most com-
petent and successful ﬁrms tend to export and to invest in production
abroad, and the same is generally true of the most successful industries. All
the research indicates an awareness of the problem, and the studies attempt
to deal with it, usually in ways found unsatisfactory by critics.
The most common type of study was of the ﬁrst question described
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market were related to the ﬁrm’s investment or production or employment
in that market. The interrelations between exports and investment could
be dealt with by assumption, as in the case of the Reddaway reports, that
in the absence of a British-owned plant in a market, the alternative was a
foreign-owned plant of the same size in the same industry (Reddaway et al.
1967, Reddaway, Potter, and Taylor 1968). That assumption essentially
guaranteed a positive, or complementary, relationship between a ﬁrm’s ex-
ports and its foreign production. In the other direction, Bergsten, Horst,
and Moran (1978, 98) described the assumptions in Frank and Freeman
(1975), and some in Hufbauer and Adler (1968), as assuming “. . . that for-
eign investment can only displace U.S. exports.” Their own analysis of the
ﬁrst set of questions, based on U.S. aggregate data, cautiously summarized,
pointed to mainly complementary relationships (Bergsten, Horst, and
Moran 1978, 93–96). The studies by Lipsey and Weiss (1981, 1984), the
ﬁrst of exports, by industry, to individual destinations, and the second of
total exports by individual U.S. ﬁrms, concluded that exports and produc-
tion abroad by U.S. ﬁrms were, for the most part, complementary. A study
using a later U.S. census of direct investment abroad found more mixed re-
sults for eﬀects on total U.S. exports, mostly no relation, but where there
was a signiﬁcant relation, more frequently positive than negative (Blom-
ström, Lipsey, and Kuchycky 1988).
Two of the few studies based on access to the conﬁdential individual ﬁrm
data collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce were Brainard (1997)
and Brainard and Riker (1997). The focus of the Brainard and Riker study
was on employment, rather than exports, but it is relevant here because em-
ployment issues lie behind much of the interest in exports. A feature of
these studies, in contrast to many earlier ones of the United States and
Sweden, is a more standard deﬁnition of complementarity and substitu-
tion, relating employment changes to wage changes in various locations.
The limitation of this deﬁnition of complementarity is that it excludes
home-country responses to variables other than the price of labor. These
might include income growth, trade restrictions, policies toward direct in-
vestment, or changes in nonlabor costs of producing outside the home
country. Brainard and Riker concluded that while there is some competi-
tion between a manufacturing ﬁrm’s employment at home and that abroad,
the degree of substitution is low. Mostly, competition takes place among
workers in aﬃliates in diﬀerent developing countries. Brainard (1997), test-
ing the importance of factor price diﬀerences as an explanation for the lo-
cation of foreign operations, dismisses it in favor of explanations based on
the advantages of proximity to markets, among other factors. She suggests
that “the overall complementarity between trade and aﬃliate sales” is at-
tributable to the fact that both “are increasing in market size and intellec-
tual property advantages . . .” (539).
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data, Braconier and Ekholm (2000), produced diﬀerent results. There was
evidence of “a substitutionary relationship between parent employment in
Sweden and aﬃliate employment in other high-income locations” but no
“evidence of a relationship in either direction between parent ﬁrm em-
ployment and aﬃliate employment in low-income locations” (459).
Concerns in Sweden about home-country eﬀects of FDI led to a series
of studies by Swedenborg (1973, 1979, 1982, 1985, 2001), and by Sweden-
borg, Johansson-Grahn, and Kinnwall (1988). An important and innova-
tive feature of Swedenborg (1979) was the use of two-stage least squares
to attempt to deal with the endogeneity of exports and the mutual deter-
mination with investment. That procedure was carried into her later work
as well. The latest of her papers (Swedenborg 2001), in addition, takes
advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the Swedish data to examine the
eﬀects on ﬁrm exports of changes in a ﬁrm’s foreign production over time.
She concludes that “the enormous growth of foreign production by
Swedish ﬁrms in the thirty-year period, 1965–94 has not, in itself, had a
negative eﬀect on parent-company exports” (121). These studies examine
parent-company exports to individual countries as well as total parent ex-
ports. Blomström, Lipsey, and Kuchycky (1988, 268–69), using total
Swedish exports and changes in them, rather than parent exports as the de-
pendent variables, found mainly positive relationships with production
abroad and its growth.
As data on Japanese multinationals have become available for research
in recent years, similar calculations have been carried out, with both par-
ent exports (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomström 2003) and Japanese in-
dustry exports (Lipsey and Ramstetter 2003) as dependent variables. In the
minority of industries where any relationship between exports and over-
seas production can be discerned, the relation was positive, as in the
United States and Sweden. The relationships for the three countries are
compared and summarized in Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomström (2000).
With the rise in unemployment levels in Europe and the increase in out-
ward FDI by European ﬁrms, the possible connection between the two has
become a popular subject for study in Europe. In a study of bilateral trade
and direct investment relationships for France, Fontagné and Pajot (2002)
found complementarity between investment ﬂows and net exports both for
countries as a whole and for individual industries, and concluded that
much of the complementarity between countries came from spillovers
among industries. Studies by Chédor and Mucchielli (1998) and by Ché-
dor, Mucchielli, and Soubaya (2002), the latter based on panel data for in-
dividual French ﬁrms and the former concerned with eﬀects of developed
countries’ direct investment in developing countries, both produced con-
clusions that investment and home-country exports were complementary.
A recent survey of Australian ﬁrms’ investment overseas concluded that
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growth and market opportunities for ﬁrms, rather than substituting for, or
displacing, operations in Australia” (Australia Productivity Commission
2002, 24). The questions about eﬀects on employment and production in
Australia both produced more than 70 percent “no change” answers, but
of those who reported changes increases were more common than de-
creases. The question on eﬀects on exports from Australia also yielded a
majority of “no change,” but of those who reported an eﬀect, the over-
whelming majority reported an increase (25).
There have been many studies for other countries, mostly examining the
relation of ﬁrms’ or industries’ foreign production to ﬁrm or industry ex-
ports. While there are some examples of negative associations, they are not
frequent, and positive associations are more common. What is noticeable
in a review of past studies, but is not commented on so often, is the fre-
quency of results indicating no association in either direction. The ele-
ments of gravity equations are consistently signiﬁcant in the expected di-
rection, while the inﬂuence of FDI production is spotty and varies among
host countries, industries, and types of parent-company exports. Bergsten,
Horst, and Moran (1978) refer to the relationship as “haphazard” (97) and
to “the presence of complementary and substitutional relations” (98).
Lipsey and Weiss (1984) found mostly complementarity, but in half the in-
dustries there were no signiﬁcant relationships at all. Blomström, Lipsey,
and Kulchycky (1988, 275) reported that “[t]he predominant relationship
between production in a country by aﬃliates of Swedish and U.S. ﬁrms and
exports to that country from Sweden and the United States is something
between neutrality and complementarity.” Swedenborg, in her latest paper,
concludes that “. . . the net eﬀect of foreign production is probably close to
zero” (2001, 117).
One way of interpreting these ﬁndings is that there are no universal rela-
tionships between production abroad by a ﬁrm or a country’s ﬁrms and ex-
ports by the investing ﬁrms, their industries, and the country as a whole.
There are circumstances in which foreign production tends to add to ex-
ports and circumstances in which it tends to reduce exports. The eﬀect may
depend on whether the foreign operations’ relation to home operations is
“horizontal” or “vertical,” a distinction stressed by Markusen and Maskus
(2001). It may also depend on the extent to which the foreign operations
are in goods production or in service activities, are in developed or devel-
oping countries, or are in industries with plant-level or ﬁrm-level econ-
omies of scale.
It seems plausible that horizontal FDI should tend to substitute for par-
ent exports, at least in manufacturing, if not in services, and that vertical
FDI might tend to add to parent exports. But there is not much evidence
for this conjecture. It is diﬃcult to classify actual foreign operations into
these theoretically neat categories. A ﬁrm’s foreign operations usually in-
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tiﬁcations in most data do not distinguish among segments of an industry.
The foreign operation may omit some parent activities, because they are
performed for the aﬃliate by the parent. And the foreign operation may in-
clude some activities that are not performed by the parent, because they
are provided by the home country’s infrastructure or by a network of out-
side suppliers that does not exist in the host country. This distinction be-
tween horizontal and vertical FDI is more useful for thinking about multi-
national behavior or constructing models of it than for empirical research.
A problem with most studies of eﬀects of FDI on home-country exports
is that the terms “substitution” and “complementarity” are not clearly de-
ﬁned. That is partly because no policy measures are speciﬁed as determin-
ing the changes in investment or production. It is rare to ﬁnd a clear coun-
terfactual to which the existing situation is being compared.
The problem is illustrated by the example of a host-country tariﬀ on
imports that leads to both a reduction or cessation of imports and the es-
tablishment of host-country production owned by the former exporters.
Higher local production is accompanied by reduced exports, an apparent
case of substitution. The implied counterfactual is the original level of ex-
ports. In fact, the alternative to the establishment or expansion of host-
country production may have been no exports and no sales by the parent
ﬁrm or its country. That counterfactual would lead to the conclusion that
the production and trade were either not related or were complementary,
instead of the apparent substitution that appears in the data.
A possible interpretation of these studies is that foreign production by a
ﬁrm or industry has very little inﬂuence on exports from the parent ﬁrm or
its home country. Mainly, trade is determined by other factors, such as
countries’ changing comparative advantages in production. Direct invest-
ment is mainly about the ownership of production, not its location. What
moves from country to country when a direct investment takes place is not
primarily physical capital or production capacity, but rather intellectual
capital, or techniques of production, unobserved and unmeasured. There
may be movements of physical or ﬁnancial capital accompanying the in-
tellectual capital, but there need not be, and they are not the essence of the
investment.
9.3.2 Foreign Direct Investment and Home-Country Factor Demand
Even if direct investment did not aﬀect the location of total production
and had no eﬀect on a home country’s exports, it could inﬂuence home-
country factor demand and factor prices through changes in the allocation
of types of production within the ﬁrm. For example, multinationals based
in rich countries might allocate their more labor-intensive production to
their aﬃliates in poor countries, while concentrating their more capital-
intensive or skill-intensive operations at home. Large diﬀerences in capital
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tries were noted in Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan (1982), but the response of
capital intensity to labor costs was tested only among aﬃliates. If multina-
tionals tended to allocate their production in this way, larger aﬃliate out-
put relative to parent output should be associated with lower labor inten-
sity and higher skill intensity in home production. In a study based on 1982
data, that relationship for labor intensity, measured by numbers of work-
ers per unit of output, was found fairly consistently among industries in
Kravis and Lipsey (1988), and less consistently for skill intensity, as mea-
sured by hourly wages. A similar calculation based on 1988 data (Lipsey
1995) found the same negative relation between aﬃliate net sales and par-
ent employment, given the level of parent output. When aﬃliate activity
was divided between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing operations, it
was the manufacturing operations that accounted for the negative relation
to parent employment; higher net sales by nonmanufacturing aﬃliates
were associated with higher parent employment, given the level of parent
output. In a later study covering the United States and Sweden, Blom-
ström, Fors, and Lipsey (1997) found that larger production in developing
countries by a U.S. ﬁrm was associated with lower labor intensity at home.
In a further analysis of these data, Lipsey (2002) found that the eﬀects on
parent factor use across all types of countries were concentrated in the ma-
chinery and transport-equipment industries. There were positive eﬀects on
parent employment per unit of output in the machinery sectors and nega-
tive eﬀects in transport equipment.
Swedish ﬁrms tended to use more labor per unit of output at home if they
produced more abroad. That might be because production abroad re-
quired supervisory and other auxiliary employment at home. Or it might
be that only the existence of foreign production enabled ﬁrms in a small
market such as Sweden to develop and support extensive headquarters and
research services. One explanation oﬀered for the diﬀerence between
Swedish and U.S. ﬁrms was that the Swedish investments in developing
countries were concentrated in import substitution activities, and the aﬃli-
ates exported little of their output, much less than U.S. aﬃliates. The
Swedish aﬃliates could not, therefore, be woven into a worldwide division
of labor that took account of factor price diﬀerences.
A later paper added Japanese ﬁrms to these comparisons (Lipsey, Ram-
stetter, and Blomström 2000). As in Swedish ﬁrms, higher levels of foreign
output, given the level of home output, led to higher employment at home
per unit of home output, presumably for supervision. It was suggested that
Japanese ﬁrms could not easily shed redundant home-country workers
even if they had wished to do so.
No explicit home-country production functions were ﬁtted in these
studies. Therefore, the variable for aﬃliate output incorporated the inﬂu-
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the size of aﬃliate production. Furthermore, most of these results are from
cross-sections. A diﬀerent approach is taken by Slaughter (2000), examin-
ing what he refers to as “MNE [multinational enterprise] transfer,” the
shift, in percentage terms, of activities from parents to their foreign aﬃli-
ates. He asks whether such “transfer” causes “skill upgrading,” increases
in the share of nonproduction worker wages in industry total wage bills, in
the corresponding domestic U.S. industries.
Slaughter ﬁts translog cost functions to data on the share of nonpro-
duction worker wages in the total wage bills of thirty-two U.S. manufac-
turing industries, taking account of relative wage rates for production and
nonproduction workers, capital-labor ratios, and output. Various mea-
sures of MNE transfer are added to these equations. All the transfer mea-
sures are based on ratios of aﬃliate activity in U.S. MNEs to total activity
in the United States in the industries of the aﬃliates. The expectation of an
eﬀect on total industry skill levels is based on the fact that the parents of
the aﬃliates account for most of their respective industries.
While higher investment in plant and equipment and higher industry
output both led to skill upgrading, increases in aﬃliate activity in host
countries had no signiﬁcant impact. Slaughter (2000, 467) concludes that
his ﬁnding “is inconsistent with models of MNEs in which aﬃliate activi-
ties substitute for parent unskilled-labor-intensive activities.” That conclu-
sion is reached despite the fact that there are no data for parent, rather than
industry, skill levels, and that the MNE transfer measure is not speciﬁc to
transfers to low-wage countries.
A diﬀerent conclusion is reached by Head and Ries (2002) for the for-
eign operations of Japanese ﬁrms. Their calculations on an industry basis,
similar to those of Slaughter (2000) for the United States, match his ﬁnd-
ings. The ratio of aﬃliate employment to the total of home and aﬃliate em-
ployment in an industry does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the share of nonpro-
duction worker wages in the total wage bill in the home country. However,
once they move to a ﬁrm-level analysis, they do ﬁnd that a higher aﬃliate
employment share in the multinational ﬁrm produces a higher nonpro-
duction worker wage share in the parent ﬁrm. That positive eﬀect is asso-
ciated with aﬃliate employment in low-wage countries; more employment
in the United States appears to have the opposite eﬀect. Thus, overseas
production in low-wage countries seems to raise the parent ﬁrm’s demand
for skilled workers at home relative to the demand for unskilled workers.
The contrast between industry- and ﬁrm-level results suggests the possi-
bility that substitution among types of activities may take place not only
between home and foreign operations of a ﬁrm, but also between parent
ﬁrms and nonmultinational ﬁrms in the same industry at home. That is a
subject that has received very little attention, but deserves investigation.
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Multinationals’ Exports
The idea that ﬁrms have comparative advantages separate from those of
their home countries has been illustrated by several episodes. One is the
contrast between the export shares of the United States and of U.S.-based
multinational ﬁrms. During the period from 1966 to 1987, the U.S. share of
world exports of manufactured goods fell from 17 percent to about 11 per-
cent, a decline of a third. Over that same period, U.S.-based multinational
ﬁrms’ share of these exports, from the parent companies and their overseas
aﬃliates combined, was quite stable, ending up in 1987 about where it be-
gan in 1966. The way this stability was achieved was that, as the world share
of exports by the parent ﬁrms fell, the share of the overseas aﬃliates of
these companies, exporting from their host countries, grew. The U.S. multi-
nationals retained their shares of world exports, while the United States as
a country was losing a large part of its share, because the multinationals’
share depended on their ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages, and the multinationals
could exploit their ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages by producing in other coun-
tries (Lipsey 1995, 12–13).
The divergence between home countries and home-country ﬁrms was
not conﬁned to the United States. For example, as Japanese export shares
fell after the currency revaluations in 1985, Japanese aﬃliate export shares
increased enough to approximately oﬀset the decline in the country’s share.
Swedish shares in world manufactured exports fell by almost a third be-
tween 1965 and 1990, but Swedish multinationals’ shares of world exports
remained stable, or even increased a little (Lipsey 1995, 14–15).
For all these countries’ multinationals, foreign production was appar-
ently not only a way of exploiting their ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets in foreign mar-
kets, but also a way of protecting these market shares against unfavorable
home-country developments. These might be exchange rate appreciations,
increases in home-country wage levels, increases in taxes, or other changes
that reduced the geographical advantages of their home countries as loca-
tions for production.
9.4 Host-Country Eﬀects of Inward Foreign Direct Investment
9.4.1 Host-Country Wages
There are several ways in which the entrance or existence of foreign ﬁrms
might aﬀect wages in the host countries where they operate. One is if these
ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages than are paid by domestic ﬁrms. That possibility
raises the question, dealt with in the next subsection, of whether they do
pay higher wages. Even if they did pay higher wages, there might be no
overall impact on wage levels if the higher wages simply reﬂected the selec-
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lect superior workers who would command high wages from any employer,
or acquire higher-wage plants or ﬁrms, or concentrate their activities in
high-wage industries or regions of a country. Thus, the second question is
whether the payment of higher wages by foreign-owned ﬁrms results in
higher wages in domestically owned ﬁrms, or “wage spillovers.” The third
question which I think is the most important from a policy point of view, is
whether the activities of foreign-owned ﬁrms cause wages in general to be
higher, on average, where they operate. That could be the result of the com-
bination of higher wages in the foreign-owned plants and wage spillovers
to domestically owned plants, but it could result from higher wages paid by
foreign-owned ﬁrms even if there were no wage spillovers, or there were
negative spillovers, to domestically owned plants. It could also occur with-
out any wage diﬀerential between foreign-owned and domestically owned
operations if labor markets were suﬃciently competitive and the rise in de-
mand for labor from foreign-owned operations forced all ﬁrms to raise
their wage levels equally.
The measurement of wage levels is in some ways simpler than the mea-
surement of productivity levels, taken up in section 9.4.2. It has its own
problems, however. Most of the data are calculated as compensation/num-
ber of workers. Very few take account of hours of work, probably most im-
portant outside manufacturing but a possible source of mismeasurement
in all industries. Probably more important is that there are few sources of
data that contain information on the characteristics of workers, so that is
impossible in most cases to distinguish between diﬀerences in wage rates
for identical workers and diﬀerences in labor quality.
Wage Comparisons
It is rare to ﬁnd a study of FDI and wages in any host country that does
not ﬁnd that foreign-owned ﬁrms pay higher wages, on average, than at
least privately owned local ﬁrms. That is the case not only in developing
countries, where most of the research has taken place, but also in devel-
oped, high-wage countries. To some extent, the diﬀerential can be ex-
plained by the industry composition of FDI, weighted toward relatively
high-wage industry sectors. However, the diﬀerential exists within indus-
tries, in most industries in most countries.
There are two broad types of questions that can be asked about this phe-
nomenon. One is about how labor markets operate in these host countries,
particularly whether foreign ﬁrms pay higher prices for labor, in the sense
of paying higher wages for workers of the same quality. The other is about
how inward FDI aﬀects labor markets, whether or not the eﬀects can be ac-
counted for by ﬁrm size, industry, capital intensity, research and develop-
ment (R&D) intensity, or other characteristics associated with foreign
ﬁrms, that could belong to domestic ﬁrms as well as to foreign ﬁrms.
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for labor of a given quality? It presumably could pay more than a domes-
tically owned ﬁrm of the same size if its superior technology produced
higher marginal labor productivity, but the expected response would be to
expand output rather than to raise wages. Several reasons have been sug-
gested. One is that it may be forced to do so by host-country regulations or
home-country pressures. The Findlay model assumes that foreign ﬁrms
pay a higher wage for labor of the same quality “for purposes of good
public relations” (1978, 9). It might be that workers prefer locally owned
ﬁrms, and must be compensated to overcome this preference. A third pos-
sibility is that foreign-owned ﬁrms pay a premium to reduce worker
turnover, because they have brought some proprietary technology and
wish to reduce the speed with which it leaks out to domestic rivals as em-
ployees change jobs. A fourth is that foreign ﬁrms, because of their limited
understanding of local labor markets, pay higher wages to attract better
workers, while more knowledgeable local ﬁrms can identify and attract
better workers without paying them higher wages.
Studies attempting to measure the pure eﬀect of foreignness are akin to
successive distillations to remove impurities. The impurities in this case are
explanations for diﬀerentials that are not necessarily intrinsic to foreign-
ness, although they may be associated with it in practice. What may be
more relevant to judging the optimum policies toward inward direct in-
vestment are studies with not quite as many controls. A state or a region or
a country that wishes to estimate the eﬀect of allowing inward FDI where
it had been prohibited, or reducing obstacles to it, may not care why the
foreign ﬁrm will pay higher wages. It is not relevant whether it is because
the ﬁrm is foreign, because it is large, or because it brings more capital-
intensive or skill-intensive production methods or better access to world
markets. A domestic ﬁrm with the same attributes might have the same im-
pact, but there may not be any such domestic ﬁrm, or if there is one, it may
not be willing to make this particular investment.
If foreign ﬁrms are found to pay higher wages than local ﬁrms, for what-
ever reason, there are still several questions to be asked about the impact.
If foreign ﬁrms hired high-wage workers away from local ﬁrms, or acquired
local ﬁrms with skilled labor forces, we might ﬁnd that foreign ownership
was associated with higher wages in the foreign-owned ﬁrms and lower
wages in domestic ﬁrms, but no diﬀerence in average industry wage levels.
If foreign ﬁrms paid more, but did not diﬀerentially poach the best work-
ers from local ﬁrms, one should ﬁnd a larger presence of foreign ownership
associated with higher wages in the industry, but not in locally owned ﬁrms
in the industry. Or ﬁnally, we might ﬁnd examples of “spillover,” where
higher foreign presence was associated with higher wages in domestically
owned establishments.
Data on wage diﬀerences come in several diﬀerent forms. Some are
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wage diﬀerences reﬂect any eﬀects of ﬁrm or plant characteristics, such as
size or capital intensity, and of worker characteristics, such as age and
education. Others adjust for diﬀerences in plant characteristics, asking
whether foreign-owned plants pay wages diﬀerent from those in otherwise
identical domestically owned plants. A third type, less common, adjusts
for diﬀerences in worker characteristics, asking whether foreign-owned
plants pay diﬀerent wages from those in domestically owned plants for
identical workers. And a fourth type, still more rare, adjusts for both plant
and worker characteristics, asking whether foreign-owned plants pay
diﬀerent wages from those in identical domestically owned plants for iden-
tical workers.
Observations of higher wages in foreign-owned ﬁrms in developing
countries go back a long time, although the earliest ones were not the re-
sult of careful statistical studies. An early study of American ﬁrms in
Colombia concluded that “Colombian labor, whenever it is paid a stipu-
lated wage, is better remunerated and granted more sanitary living quar-
ters by foreigners than by natives, but the foreigners probably exact more
systematic and strenuous eﬀort” (Rippy 1931, 190). Another partial ex-
planation for the higher wages was that “the American companies are ea-
ger to attract the most eﬃcient labor” (Rippy, 191).
A study by Blomström (1983) of Mexican manufacturing industries in
1970 found that foreign-owned ﬁrms paid wages about 25 percent above
those in domestically owned ﬁrms in manufacturing as a whole. Foreign
ﬁrms’ wage levels were also higher in each of four major groups of manu-
facturing industries, by 25 to 30 percent, except in capital goods industries,
where the diﬀerence was much smaller (18–19).
Many of the recent studies of wages in foreign plants in developing coun-
tries have been based on manufacturing-sector data on individual estab-
lishments collected in national surveys and assembled by the World Bank.
A number of them were carried out by Ann Harrison, in collaboration with
several others, and wage data for three of these studies are summarized in
Harrison (1996). There were statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
wages in foreign-owned and domestically owned plants in three out of
twelve industries in Côte d’Ivoire, twelve out of eighteen in Morocco, and
eight out of nine in Venezuela. Ratios of foreign to domestic plant wages,
where the diﬀerences were signiﬁcant, ranged from 1.1 to 1.9 in Côte
d’Ivoire, 1.3 to 2.6 in Morocco, and 1.2 to 2.0 in Venezuela. These are
simple diﬀerences without adjustment for plant or worker characteristics.
One problem with cross-sectional analyses of wage diﬀerences is the un-
known role of unmeasured aspects of plant heterogeneity. For Venezuela,
that problem could be dealt with by examining wages in individual plants
over time. While the relationship between wages and foreign ownership of
a plant was weaker, and the diﬀerential smaller than in aggregated data,
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tal intensity, resulted in wages higher by 16–18 percent (Aitken, Harrison,
and Lipsey 1996, 368).
A paper on Morocco by Haddad and Harrison (1993) found that wages
were 70 percent higher, on average, in foreign ﬁrms (58). The diﬀerence
partly reﬂected the greater size of the foreign-owned ﬁrms; in weighted
means, calculated to eliminate the size eﬀect, the diﬀerence was reduced
to 30 percent. The weighted average mean real wages were signiﬁcantly
higher in foreign-owned ﬁrms in sixteen out of eighteen individual indus-
tries. All the industries in which the wage diﬀerences were statistically sig-
niﬁcant showed higher wages in the foreign-owned plants. Something of an
oddity, which casts some suspicion on the productivity measures discussed
later, is that these higher wages in foreign-owned plants were accompanied
by lower output per worker, at least in the weighted averages, and lower to-
tal factor productivity.
Several studies of Indonesia, such as Hill (1990) and Manning (1998),
found that foreign ﬁrms paid higher wages than domestic ﬁrms. A recent
paper using establishment data for Indonesia (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2003)
found that in 1996, foreign-owned ﬁrms paid about 50 percent higher
wages than private domestically owned ﬁrms in manufacturing as a whole,
for both blue-collar and white-collar workers. When account was taken of
the education levels of the workers, and of the industry and location of
plants, foreign ownership was associated with wages about 25 percent
higher for blue-collar workers and 50 percent higher for white-collar work-
ers. Much of the diﬀerential was associated with the larger size of foreign-
owned plants and greater inputs of energy and other intermediate product.
The authors concluded that there was strong evidence that foreign ﬁrms
“paid a higher price for labor than domestically-owned plants” (13). They
paid a higher price, by a large margin, for workers of a given educational
level (something most studies do not have information on, because busi-
ness censuses rarely include labor-force characteristics). Even with the
eﬀects of plant and worker characteristics removed, blue-collar workers
in foreign-owned plants earned about 12 percent more than in domestic
plants and white-collar workers about 20 percent more (Lipsey and
Sjöholm).
In four East Asian countries for which Ramstetter (1999, table 2) re-
ported wages in foreign and domestic plants or ﬁrms, averaged over four-
teen- to twenty-three-year periods, wages were higher in the foreign-owned
ones, although in Singapore and Taiwan the diﬀerences were not signiﬁ-
cant.
Similar questions can be asked about wages in foreign-owned plants in
developed countries. The increasing availability of individual ﬁrm and es-
tablishment microdata sets has encouraged such studies. In the United
States, the linking of Economic Census establishment data with Bureau of
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BEA-Census data for 1987, the ﬁrst such match, Lipsey (1994) found that
workers in foreign-owned establishments earned 10–12 percent more than
those in domestically owned establishments in the same two-digit standard
industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) industries and states. They earned 6–7 per-
cent more in manufacturing and 12–15 percent more in other industries.
Howenstine and Zeile (1994), using access to more-detailed information
by industry and location not available outside the Department of Com-
merce, found similar diﬀerentials in manufacturing, all of which they could
explain by diﬀerences in establishment size. Using individual manufactur-
ing-plant data, Doms and Jensen (1998) found that even controlling for
four-digit industry, state, plant size, and plant age, foreign-owned plants
paid higher wages. They attributed the higher wage in foreign plants to the
fact that they were parts of multinational ﬁrms, a theory they felt was con-
ﬁrmed by the fact that the highest wages of all were paid by domestic plants
that were parts of U.S. multinational ﬁrms. One question about this com-
parison is whether foreign subsidiaries in the United States were compa-
rable to the establishments of U.S. multinationals, since the latter could in-
clude ﬁrm headquarters operations, a high-paid category probably not
part of the U.S. operations of foreign multinationals.
A recent paper used both the 1987 and 1992 BEA-Census matches for
establishments, combined into state by detailed industry cells for foreign-
owned and domestically owned establishments (Feliciano and Lipsey
1999). Foreign-owned establishments in the United States paid higher
wages than domestically owned ones in all industries taken together, by 23
percent in 1987 and 15 percent in 1992 (table 2). Once average establish-
ment size, education levels in the state and industry, state unionization lev-
els, and percent female in the state labor force were accounted for, and
industry dummies were included, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
manufacturing. However, foreign-owned establishments paid higher wages
in nonmanufacturing, by 8.5 to 9.5 percent (tables 3A and 3B).
While the United States has been the subject of the largest number of
studies, there have been some for other developed countries as well. An
early study of American direct investment in Australia (Brash 1966) con-
cluded, from a survey, that “it . . . appears beyond a doubt that even within
each industry American-aﬃliated ﬁrms on average pay higher total in-
comes to their employees than do ﬁrms without American connections”
(129). Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994) reported higher wages in for-
eign-owned plants in Canada.
In recent years, establishment microdata have become available for the
United Kingdom, and these have been used for wage and other compar-
isons. Griﬃth and Simpson (2001) report that foreign-owned establish-
ments in the United Kingdom paid higher wages than domestically owned
establishments for both operatives and administrative and technical em-
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employees, and widened considerably over the period. An earlier paper
(Griﬃth 1999) compared wages in foreign-owned plants of companies
based in France, Germany, Japan, and the United States with those in do-
mestically owned plants. It found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for 1980, ex-
cept in U.S.-owned plants, but higher wages in foreign-owned plants in
1992, by margins ranging from 8 to 25 percent (Griﬃth, 428). In the motor
vehicle and engines industry, examined in more detail in the article, there
were only small margins for operatives, 2 to 4 percent, but foreign-owned
plants paid around 25 percent more to administrative, technical, and cler-
ical workers (431).
A set of “survivors,” establishments present in the U.K. Annual Census
of Production (or ARD) throughout the period 1973–1993, was assembled
by Oulton (2001). He reports that foreign-owned establishments paid av-
erage wages for operatives that were above the average for U.K.-owned es-
tablishments by 17 percent for non-U.S. establishments and 26 percent for
U.S.-owned establishments. The margins for administrative, technical, and
clerical (ATC) employees were 12 and 24 percent. The plants diﬀered in
other respects as well: foreign-owned plants, and especially U.S.-owned
plants, were characterized by higher capital per worker, much higher inter-
mediate input per worker, and higher proportions of ATC employees (129).
Although there is no evidence on worker quality, Oulton attributes the
wage diﬀerential to higher human capital per worker in the foreign plants,
because “companies do not pay higher wages out of the goodness of their
hearts” (130). A set of regressions including industry dummy variables in-
dicates that industry composition accounts for little of the diﬀerential.
Within industries, U.S.-owned establishments paid 14 to 15 percent more
than domestic establishments, and other foreign establishments paid 10
percent more to operatives and 8 percent more to ATC workers (132).
Using a large sample of U.K. ﬁrms from 1991 to 1996, Girma, Green-
away, and Wakelin (2001) reported an overall wage diﬀerential of 14 per-
cent in favor of workers in foreign-owned ﬁrms, and a diﬀerential of almost
10 percent when industry and scale of operations are taken into account.
In addition, wage growth was higher by 0.4 percent per year in the foreign-
owned ﬁrms (tables 1 and 2). They summarized their reading of earlier lit-
erature as showing “considerable evidence to support a wage diﬀerential in
favour of foreign owned ﬁrms” (121).
Driﬃeld and Girma (2003) reported that foreign-owned establishments
in the U.K. electronics industry in 1980 to 1992 paid wages higher by 7.6
and 6.0 percent for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, and also em-
ployed a higher proportion of skilled workers (14).
Since there is always a problem of the eﬀect of unknown ﬁrm character-
istics on these comparisons, a tempting solution is to observe ﬁrms that are
acquired by foreign owners. That solution is rare because of the lack of ac-
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ﬁrms in the United Kingdom taken over by domestic and foreign acquirers
and matching data for over 600 ﬁrms that did not change ownership. At the
time of acquisition, the ﬁrms acquired by foreigners paid wages about the
same as those of ﬁrms acquired by domestic owners. However, in the ﬁrst,
second, and third years after acquisition, ﬁrms acquired by foreigners
raised their wages faster than did ﬁrms acquired by domestic owners (table
5). Controlling for ﬁxed ﬁrm and industry eﬀects and aggregate time
shocks, the authors found that wages rose by 3.4 percent in ﬁrms acquired
by foreigners and fell by 2.1 percent in ﬁrms acquired by domestic owners.
Controlling also for ﬁrm size and industry wages hardly changed the re-
sults. Adding productivity change as a control variable eliminated the diﬀ-
erential in favor of foreign ﬁrms (p. 9 and table 6), but if one is interested in
measuring wage diﬀerentials rather than explaining them, productivity
change is not an appropriate control.
The evidence seems to me overwhelming that foreign-owned ﬁrms in all
kinds of economies pay higher wages than domestically owned ﬁrms. It is
harder to say whether they also pay a higher price for labor—that is, a
higher wage for workers of a given quality—although one of the few stud-
ies that incorporates quality measures ﬁnds that they do. Much of the dif-
ferential, all of it in some studies, can be associated with the larger size of
the foreign-owned operations. However, higher capital intensity and
higher inputs of intermediate products, leading to higher productivity, are
also important. If regions or countries encouraging inward investment are
interested in encouraging high-wage plants, foreign investors seem to meet
that desire.
Wage Spillovers
Whether or not foreign-owned ﬁrms in a country pay higher wages than
domestic ﬁrms, their presence might still aﬀect the level of wages in do-
mestically owned plants. Such eﬀects are referred to as wage spillovers to
domestically owned plants. They would not take place in the world envi-
sioned in the Findlay (1978, 8) model. There, “[t]he economy is considered
able to draw on a reservoir of labor in a ‘peasant hinterland’ as in the fa-
mous model of Arthur Lewis (1954) and also on a substantial ‘industrial
reserve army’ of urban unemployed.” However, domestic ﬁrm wage eﬀects
from inward investment could take place in any world where the supply
curve for labor was not horizontal.
Calculations of wage spillovers in two developing countries, Mexico and
Venezuela, are included in Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996). Impacts
of shares of employment in foreign-owned plants in an industry and region
on wages in domestically owned establishments were measured. In Mexico,
wages in domestically owned plants appeared to be lower where foreign
ownership was high, but the coeﬃcients were not statistically signiﬁcant.
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of foreign presence on wages in domestically owned plants. To some extent,
this result could reﬂect a reallocation of the labor force to foreign plants,
through the “poaching” of better workers or the acquisition of higher-
paying plants by foreigners. However, if this had been the whole story, there
would not have been, as there was, a positive eﬀect of higher foreign own-
ership on total industry wages.
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2003, 26–27) made a variety of calculations of
spillovers from foreign presence to wages in domestically owned establish-
ments in Indonesia, calculating foreign presence at various levels of in-
dustry and geographical detail. In every variant, there were signiﬁcant
spillovers to domestically owned establishments. The coeﬃcients on for-
eign shares in wage equations were larger than the observed wage diﬀeren-
tials, suggesting some impact through increases in the demand for labor.
The coeﬃcients were generally higher for white-collar than for blue-collar
workers.
In their study of South Carolina counties described below, Figlio and
Blonigen (2000) did not have the data needed for testing for spillovers from
inward investment. However, they concluded that the eﬀect of the invest-
ment on aggregate wage levels was so large that it could not have been
conﬁned to the foreign plants themselves, and must have involved some
spillovers to domestically owned plants (352, n 12).
In Feliciano and Lipsey (1999), the existence of two years of data per-
mitted the authors to examine the eﬀects of changes in the extent of foreign
ownership in the United States in a state by industry cell on wages in do-
mestically owned establishments. In manufacturing, there were no signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects (table 4a). In nonmanufacturing industries, there were large
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on domestic ﬁrm wages, although the
signiﬁcance became marginal when state by industry education levels were
added.
Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2001) test for wage spillovers to do-
mestic ﬁrms in their U.K. company data set for the 1991–1996 period and
ﬁnd no overall spillover eﬀect on wage levels and a small negative eﬀect on
wage growth (128). The only ﬁrm characteristic that appears to inﬂuence
the extent of wage spillovers is the gap in productivity between a ﬁrm and
the ﬁrm in the industry at the 90th percentile in productivity. The larger the
productivity gap, the smaller the wage spillover. The only industry charac-
teristic that aﬀects wage spillovers is the degree of import penetration. The
higher it is, the larger the wage spillover.
Some of the literature on wage spillovers from foreign-owned to domes-
tically owned ﬁrms has recently been reviewed by Görg and Greenaway
(2001). They summarize the results of panel data studies as showing mostly
negative spillovers and cross-section studies as showing positive spillovers.
There is no overlap in the countries studied, but the authors are skeptical
352 Robert E. Lipseyabout all ﬁndings from cross-section studies on the ground that they can-
not take account of unknown ﬁrm characteristics. My own judgment is
that there are enough indications of positive wage spillovers, even in panel
data studies, to preclude any conclusion that they are typically negative.
What is needed most is more consideration of the diﬀerent circumstances
and policies of countries, industries, and ﬁrms that promote or obstruct
spillovers.
Eﬀects on Average Wages
Whether or not wages are higher in foreign-owned plants than in do-
mestically owned plants, and whether or not, where there are higher wages,
they spill over to domestically owned plants, a higher degree of foreign
ownership could aﬀect the average level of wages in a country or industry.
It might do so either by raising the demand for labor or through the higher
wages paid by the foreign plants themselves.
Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996, 352) reported that, even though
there were no spillovers or negative spillovers to domestically owned plants
in Mexico and Venezuela, there was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of foreign owner-
ship shares in raising average industry wages. The eﬀect was larger for
skilled workers than for unskilled, and larger in Venezuela than in Mexico.
Feenstra and Hanson (1997), deﬁning skilled workers simply as nonpro-
duction workers, found that a higher level of maquiladoraactivity in a Mex-
ican industry within a state led to a higher share of total wages’ going to
skilled workers. They interpreted this increase in the nonproduction wage
share as implying a rise in the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled
labor resulting from the growth in maquiladora production by foreign,
mainly U.S., ﬁrms. The increase in the wage share of nonproduction work-
ers could be a combination of relative wage increases for them or relative
increases in their numbers. However, there is some evidence of particularly
large relative wage growth for nonproduction workers in the border region,
where most of the maquiladorasare located, in the periods after investment
rules were liberalized.
The eﬀect of changes in foreign ownership from 1987 to 1992 on average
wages in state by industry cells in the United States were found to be in-
signiﬁcant in manufacturing by Feliciano and Lipsey (1999, tables 5a and
5b). However, outside the manufacturing sector, increases in foreign own-
ership were associated with increases in average wages.
One avenue of relative wage increases that might be associated with in-
creases in foreign ownership is skill upgrading, shifting the demand for
labor in an industry toward higher skill. Blonigen and Slaughter (2001),
measuring skill upgrading by the share of skilled wages in the total wage
bill, ﬁnd no evidence of such an eﬀect from increases in foreign presence in
U.S. manufacturing industries, a result that matches Feliciano and Lipsey
(1999). They ﬁnd some negative eﬀect from Japanese investment in U.S.
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are not typical.
In a more local study, Figlio and Blonigen (2000) reported that, in South
Carolina, the addition of foreign-owned manufacturing plants was associ-
ated with increases in real wages for all workers in the same industry and
county. The gain was much larger than that from the addition of new, do-
mestically owned plants.
I would summarize the sparse evidence on overall wage levels as point-
ing to positive eﬀects of FDI activity. When there are no spillovers, the
eﬀect might be wholly from the higher wages oﬀered by the foreign ﬁrms,
or it might reﬂect the impact of foreign ﬁrms on the aggregate demand for
labor. When there are positive spillovers, they add to the impact of the for-
eign ﬁrms. Even when there are negative spillovers, they do not seem to be
large enough to oﬀset the positive eﬀect of the foreign ﬁrms’ high wages or
the eﬀects of increased demand for labor.
9.4.2 Host-Country Productivity
The issues that arise with respect to measuring eﬀects on wages in host
countries are also involved in judging eﬀects on productivity. The impact
on the host countries in this respect presumably stems mainly from the su-
perior eﬃciency of the foreign-owned operations. The ﬁrst question, then,
is whether foreign-owned ﬁrms or establishments are more eﬃcient. If they
are, the second question is whether their superior productivity spills over
to locally owned ﬁrms in their industries, or their industries within their re-
gions, or related industries. Locally owned ﬁrms might increase their eﬃ-
ciency by copying the operations of the foreign-owned ﬁrms, or be forced
by competition from foreign-owned ﬁrms to raise their eﬃciency to sur-
vive. On the negative side, it is conceivable that foreign-owned operations
are more eﬃcient only because foreigners have taken over the more-
eﬃcient local ﬁrms, leaving the less eﬃcient in local ownership. Or by tak-
ing markets from local ﬁrms, foreign-owned ﬁrms might force the locally
owned ﬁrms into less-eﬃcient scales of production. The third and broad-
est question is whether, as a result of the operations of foreign-owned ﬁrms,
there are improvements in aggregate industry eﬃciency. Those could arise
from spillovers, but they could come simply from the higher eﬃciency of
foreign ﬁrms, even if the higher eﬃciency is conﬁned to the foreign ﬁrms.
There could also be increases in aggregate productivity without any visible
productivity diﬀerentials between foreign-owned and domestically owned
ﬁrms, if the industry were suﬃciently competitive that the entry of foreign-
owned ﬁrms forced their domestically owned competitors to match them
quickly to survive. These possibilities point to the importance of examin-
ing not only ﬁrms that remain in an industry over the period of observa-
tion, but also ﬁrms that enter or exit, because they may account for many
of the changes in productivity for an industry or country.
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bor input (the simplest) to value-added per unit of labor and capital input
and value of output per unit of labor, capital, and intermediate product
input. Some studies ﬁt production functions that also incorporate scale
economies. The result is to ignore any host-country beneﬁt from the ac-
quisition of physical capital, or from any advance in technology that con-
sists of the adoption of more capital-intensive methods of production or
larger scale production.
Most theoretical discussions of the possible role of inward investment
refer to the transmission of superior technology. The examination of pro-
ductivity is an attempt to measure technology gaps and changes in tech-
nology. That is a narrow view of multinationals’ technology advantages,
which may consist more of their knowledge of world markets or methods
of coordinating production over many countries. Almost all the measure-
ment is conﬁned to manufacturing, a large part of multinational activity,
but far from the whole of it.
Many of the problems in studying productivity involve the measurement
of capital input. Most sources of establishment data either do not report
capital stocks, or report nominal values. These are likely to bear a small re-
semblance to market values, especially in countries that have undergone
major inﬂation. Where even nominal capital values are missing, they are
often calculated from past expenditures using the perpetual-inventory
method. Such calculations, if done properly, should be based not on gen-
eral deﬂators but on capital-goods price indexes—scarce and subject to se-
rious doubts even in the best of statistical systems. The complications sug-
gest caution in drawing conclusions and the advisability of comparing
total factor productivity measures with labor productivity and wages to see
whether the relations among them are logical.
Productivity Comparisons
Comparisons of productivity between foreign-owned and domestically
owned ﬁrms have been far more common than comparisons of wage levels.
Much of the productivity literature has been directed at the question of
whether there were spillovers to domestic ﬁrms, but that question itself im-
plies the expectation that foreign ﬁrms are more eﬃcient. The comparisons
themselves range from simple overall productivity comparisons to at-
tempts to explain diﬀerences between foreign and domestic ﬁrms. The ex-
planatory variables, aside from nationality of ownership, include capital
intensity, skill intensity, and the scale of operations. These comparisons
ask, in eﬀect, whether foreign ﬁrms that diﬀer from domestic ﬁrms diﬀer
because they operate on diﬀerent production functions or because they op-
erate at diﬀerent points on the same functions.
Most of the productivity comparisons have been for the manufacturing
sectors in developing countries. Blomström and Wolﬀ (1994), examining
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output per employee to have been more than twice as high in multinational
corporation– (MNC) owned plants overall as in private domestic plants,
and higher in each of 20 individual manufacturing industries (266). Since
capital intensities in MNC plants were also much higher, the total factor
productivity (TFP) margins were smaller. They were about a third overall,
and three industries showed higher TFP in the domestic plants (267, 268).
Okamoto and Sjöholm (1999), examining Indonesian manufacturing mi-
crodata from 1990 to 1995, reported higher foreign shares of gross output
than of employment in almost every industry, implying that labor produc-
tivity was higher in the foreign-owned plants. Sjöholm (1999) examined In-
donesian establishment data for 1980 and 1991, calculating diﬀerences in
“technology” between foreign-owned and domestically owned establish-
ments. Technology diﬀerences were measured as the coeﬃcients on for-
eign-ownership dummies in equations relating value-added per worker in
1980 and 1991 to scale, 1980 investment expenditure per worker as a proxy
for capital intensity, and dummy variables for 1991 observations and for-
eign ownership. The estimated technology diﬀerences were found to be
in favor of the foreign-owned establishments in twenty-six out of twenty-
eight industries. Kokko, Zejan, and Tansini (2001) reported that in
Uruguay in 1988, productivity, as measured by value-added per worker,
was about twice as high on average in foreign ﬁrms as in domestic ﬁrms.
Haddad and Harrison (1993) found, for Morocco in 1985–1989, that out-
put per worker was higher, and deviations from best-practice frontiers were
smaller in foreign-owned ﬁrms than in domestically owned ﬁrms in twelve
out of eighteen industries, and in all eight of the industries in which the
diﬀerences were statistically signiﬁcant.
Kathuria (2000) studied Indian ﬁrms in twenty-six manufacturing in-
dustries over the fourteen years from 1975–1976 to 1988–1989, in a “pre-
liberalization period when Indian industry was highly regulated in terms of
industrial and technology policy” (346). The main productivity measure-
ment used was a ﬁrm’s distance from its industry’s technological frontier.
In thirteen of the twenty-six industries, a foreign ﬁrm was the technologi-
cal leader, and in ﬁfteen industries, foreign ﬁrms were, on average, more
eﬃcient. An unusual feature of the data is that because employment was
not reported, it was estimated from compensation, assuming that local and
foreign ﬁrms pay the same wages. That assumption, if we can judge from
the wage studies, almost certainly overstates employment in foreign ﬁrms
and understates their productivity.
Chuang and Lin (1999) report that among a random sample of manu-
facturing ﬁrms in Taiwan in 1991, foreign-owned ﬁrms had considerably
higher labor productivity than domestically owned ﬁrms, but only very
slightly higher TFP. The foreign-owned ﬁrms were much larger and much
more capital intensive. For Malaysia, in 1992–1996, Oguchi et al. (2002)
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ated with about equal eﬃciency. However, foreign-owned ﬁrms were more
eﬃcient in twenty-three out of twenty-nine 3-digit industries, including
both nonelectrical and electrical machinery. In the electronic components
5-digit industry, an extremely important one for Malaysia as an exporter,
foreign-owned ﬁrms were more than 3.5 times as eﬃcient as domestically
owned ﬁrms.
Comparing foreign-owned with domestically owned ﬁrms or plants in
ﬁve East Asian countries over ﬁfteen- to twenty-year periods, Ramstetter
(1999) reported that value-added per employee was higher in the foreign-
owned plants in all the countries. However, Malaysian data conﬁned to
large ﬁrms showed higher productivity in the local ﬁrms in the later part of
the period. Foreign-owned Turkish plants in 1993–1995 had higher pro-
ductivity than domestically owned plants even when various elements of
the production function are taken account of (Erdilek 2002).
There have been fewer examinations of the productivity of foreign-
owned and domestically owned ﬁrms within developed countries. Notable
studies of the United States include Howenstine and Zeile (1994), and
Doms and Jensen (1998), mentioned earlier. Howenstine and Zeile, using
the combined BEA and Census establishment data for manufacturing,
found that foreign-owned plants had higher labor productivity than do-
mestically owned ones. They attributed the diﬀerence largely to “the ten-
dency for foreign-owned establishments to be concentrated in industries in
which productivity is high” and the within-industry diﬀerences to “plant
size, capital intensity, and employee skill level—rather than foreign own-
ership per se.” Doms and Jensen concluded that foreign-owned plants were
superior to U.S.-owned plants of nonmultinational ﬁrms, even large ﬁrms,
in both labor productivity and TFP, but that they were behind plants
owned by U.S. multinationals. Thus they ﬁnd multinationality of the ﬁrm
to be strongly associated with productivity levels, beyond the association
with size and other plant characteristics. A similar hierarchy characterized
the ranking with respect to the “number of technologies” used in each type
of plant (246–250).
Comparisons within the United Kingdom go back for many years, at
least to Dunning (1958) and Dunning and Rowan (1970). Some recent
studies, such as Griﬃth and Simpson (2001), Conyon et al. (1999), and
Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2001), are based on individual establish-
ment data from the ARD. Dunning (1958) compared output per man-year
in a sample of U.S. aﬃliates with that in the average U.K. ﬁrm (including
the aﬃliates) in ten industrial groups in 1950 and 1954. He found that the
U.S. aﬃliates’ productivity was higher in every one (table 16). Dunning and
Rowan (1970) applied a number of diﬀerent tests of eﬃciency to U.S.- and
U.K.-owned ﬁrms in the United Kingdom. Although each test seemed sub-
ject to one bias or another, the preponderance of evidence pointed to
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ported that gross value-added per worker in foreign-owned manufacturing
enterprises in the United Kingdom was, on average, almost 50 percent
higher than that of domestically owned enterprises in 1987. No more than
half the diﬀerence was due to the industrial composition of the foreign-
owned ﬁrms, but some might be due to “diﬀerentials in labour skills, capi-
tal input, vertical integration, or monopoly power” (593). The diﬀerentials
within the United Kingdom in 1977 were signiﬁcantly related to the inter-
national productivity diﬀerentials, by industry, between the United States
and the United Kingdom in 1976. Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2001)
found in their data set for 1991–1996 that among ﬁrms with no change in
ownership, productivity in foreign-owned ﬁrms in the United Kingdom
was about 10 percent above that for domestically owned ﬁrms and TFP
about 5 percent higher. Labor and TFP growth rates in foreign-owned
plants were higher by about 1.5 percent per year. Conyon et al. (1999)
found that acquisitions of U.K. ﬁrms by foreigners led to increases in their
proﬁtability. A study by Harris and Robinson (2002) of the selection of es-
tablishments for foreign acquisition, also based on the ARD, conﬁrmed
the suspicion that foreign ﬁrms selected relatively high-productivity plants
to acquire. Each group of plants was compared to a reference group of
plants belonging to U.K. multiplant ﬁrms that did not sell any plants to
foreign ﬁrms during 1982–1992. Plants that were foreign-owned during the
whole period were more productive than those in the control group. Plants
that were sold by U.K. ﬁrms to foreign ﬁrms in 1982–1986 or 1987–1992
were still more productive, as were plants sold by one U.K. ﬁrm to another.
Thus, plant turnover in general seemed to involve relatively productive
plants.
The evidence on productivity, whatever the measure, is close to unani-
mous on the higher productivity of foreign-owned plants in both devel-
oped and developing countries. Some of that higher productivity, but not
all in most comparisons, can be attributed to higher capital intensity or
larger scale of production in the foreign-owned plants.
Productivity and Knowledge Spillovers to Domestic Firms
Theories of the eﬀect of direct investment on host countries have gener-
ally taken it for granted that foreign-owned ﬁrms possessed superior tech-
nology and that some of that technological knowledge spills over to the
host-country economy. Findlay (1978) hypothesized that “the rate of
change of technical eﬃciency in the backward region is an increasing func-
tion of the relative extent to which the activities of foreign ﬁrms with their
superior technology pervade the local economy” (5). He also combined
with that assumption the idea that the larger the gap in technology, the
faster the transmission, provided that “the disparity must not be too wide
for the thesis to hold” (2). Wang and Blomström (1992) added, as expla-
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country environment and host-country ﬁrms. The transmission of tech-
nology would be accelerated by a more competitive business environment
and greater investment in learning and imitation by competing host-
country ﬁrms (153).
Most studies of productivity spillovers from foreign investment assume
that they occur mainly in the industry in which the foreign ﬁrm operates.
Blomström and Kokko (1998) refer to the literature on backward linkages
as examples of spillovers outside those industries, to supplying industries.
These arise partly from eﬀorts by multinational ﬁrms to improve the qual-
ity of the intermediate products they buy locally, sometimes under duress.
However, they may arise without explicit help, from the competition
among local ﬁrms to become the suppliers to the multinationals. The only
statistical examination of this issue they report is from an unpublished pa-
per on Venezuela by Aitken and Harrison (1991), which reported negative
eﬀects of FDI in an industry on productivity in upstream industries. The
reason oﬀered was that foreign ﬁrms shift the demand for intermediate in-
puts from domestic to foreign producers, reducing the scale of output, and
therefore productivity, in domestic production. The paper did, however, re-
port positive eﬀects of FDI on downstream industries. These calculations
do not appear in the later, published, version of the paper. On the whole,
the interindustry eﬀects of foreign participation have received a great deal
of speculation, but little statistical testing. However, a recent examination
of the existence of spillovers in Lithuanian manufacturing industries from
1996 to 2000 (Smarzynska 2002) concluded that there were positive
spillovers through backward linkages. The evidence for productivity gains
by supplying ﬁrms was stronger for foreign aﬃliates in the same region as
the supplier, and was larger for foreign aﬃliates serving the host-country
market than for those serving export markets.
Among studies of spillovers within industries, one for Venezuela by
Aitken and Harrison (1999, 616) found that “increases in foreign equity
participation are correlated with increases in productivity” for small
plants, but that increases in foreign ownership in an industry negatively
aﬀected productivity in domestically owned plants in the same industry.
The positive eﬀects within the foreign plants exceeded the negative eﬀects,
but only slightly. The positive relationships found by others, they argued,
were due to the tendency of foreign ﬁrms to invest in high-productivity sec-
tors and ﬁrms (616, 617). The authors report similar ﬁndings for Indone-
sia, except that there the positive eﬀects are larger than in Venezuela and
the negative eﬀects smaller (617).
Using data from the Mexican Industrial Census for 1970, Blomström
(1983) and Blomström and Persson (1983) found that the labor productiv-
ity in domestically owned plants was positively related to the extent of for-
eign presence in the industry. That was true even when diﬀerences in capi-
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study based on the same Mexican census, Kokko (1994) conﬁrmed the ex-
istence of productivity spillovers to locally owned ﬁrms and found some
evidence that high capital intensity in an industry and a high level of tech-
nology might inhibit spillovers. A stronger conclusion was that the combi-
nation of large technology gaps between foreign and domestic ﬁrms and
large foreign market shares, which the author describes as “enclave” situa-
tions, discourages spillovers. Blomström and Wolﬀ (1994), on the basis of
Mexican census data, concluded that higher foreign shares in an industry
in 1970 led to higher rates of productivity growth in locally owned ﬁrms
over the next ﬁve years. Local ﬁrm productivity growth was higher in in-
dustries in which the local ﬁrms’ productivity levels were initially closer to
those of the foreign-owned ﬁrms (270). Higher foreign shares in an indus-
try were also associated with faster convergence of Mexican-industry pro-
ductivity toward U.S.-industry productivity levels, again more strongly in
industries in which the initial gap was smaller (275).
Kathuria (2000), in a study of spillovers to Indian manufacturing ﬁrms,
found that a division of the manufacturing sectors into “scientiﬁc” and
“nonscientiﬁc” subgroups showed positive spillovers in the scientiﬁc sec-
tors, but none in the nonscientiﬁc ones. One conclusion was that “spill-
overs are not found to be automatic consequences of foreign ﬁrms’ pres-
ence, but they depend to a large extent on the eﬀorts of local ﬁrms to invest
in learning or R&D activities so as to decodify the spilled knowledge”
(364). He thus supports the theoretical model proposed by Wang and
Blomström (1992). Buckley, Clegg, and Wang (2002) studied several types
of spillovers in China in a study based on the Third Industrial Census
of China, for 1995, early in the Chinese FDI boom. Higher foreign pres-
ence in an industry resulted in higher labor productivity in domestically
owned ﬁrms, holding constant capital intensity, R&D intensity, and labor
quality.
A pioneering attempt to measure impacts on domestic ﬁrms in devel-
oped countries was Caves (1974), on Canada and Australia. He found
some evidence that higher shares in an industry for foreign subsidiaries
were weakly, and negatively, related to the proﬁtability of Canadian ﬁrms,
a possible indication that foreign ﬁrms raised the level of competition and
reduced the excess proﬁts that had been earned by their local rivals. How-
ever, he was not certain that the relation was not due entirely to diﬀerences
in the attainment of economies of scale. In Australian manufacturing, he
found that “higher subsidiary shares do apparently coincide with higher
productivity levels in competing domestic ﬁrms” (190). However no such
relationship could be found between changes in foreign shares and changes
in the productivity of domestic ﬁrms, a fact that reduced his conﬁdence in
the signiﬁcance of the ﬁnding for levels (190–191). A later study by Glober-
man (1979), for a sample of manufacturing industries in 1972, concluded
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in part, from spillover eﬃciency beneﬁts associated with foreign direct in-
vestment” (53).
Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2002) use British panel data to relate
changes in TFP of domestically owned British establishments to changes
in foreign presence, measured by shares in employment, in the establish-
ment’s industry, region, or industry in the region. Signiﬁcant evidence is
found for positive spillovers within industries. Positive spillovers are found
to come from U.S. and French presence, but Japanese presence produces
negative spillovers. The authors conclude that, of the aggregate increase of
11 percent in British TFP from 1972 to 1992, 5 percent could be ascribed
to spillovers from foreign-owned plants (17). Girma, Greenaway, and
Wakelin (2001) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of foreign presence, measured by
shares of employment or output, on the labor productivity or TFP of U.K.
ﬁrms in general during 1991–1996. However, the higher the skill level of the
industry, and the greater the degree of foreign competition in the industry,
the larger the productivity spillover. And the larger the individual ﬁrm’s
distance from the productivity leader in its industry (the ﬁrm at the 90th
percentile in TFP), the smaller the spillover (129). Thus they point to the
importance of ﬁrm and industry characteristics in determining the extent
of spillovers, as well as, possibly, trade policy, as represented by import
penetration levels. Examining changes in productivity in domestically
owned U.K. ﬁrms between 1989 and 1992, Driﬃeld (2001) ﬁnds no
spillovers related to the amount of sales by foreign-owned ﬁrms or their
R&D stock. However, the growth of labor productivity among foreign-
owned ﬁrms in the previous period, from 1986 to 1989, did lead to pro-
ductivity growth among domestically owned ﬁrms in the same industry. He
concluded that “the foreign productivity advantage was responsible for
anaverage increase in domestic productivity of 0.75 per cent a year” (113).
Girma and Wakelin (2000), also using U.K. microdata for manufacturing
establishments, found evidence of positive spillovers to domestic ﬁrms in
the same region as the foreign ﬁrms, but some evidence of negative
spillovers outside the regions. They also concluded that low technology
gaps between domestic and foreign ﬁrms and location in more technolog-
ically advanced regions promoted spillovers.
In a study of labor-productivity spillovers in Italian manufacturing in
1988, Imbriani and Reganati (1997) found that, across all industries, for-
eign shares in employment were positively associated with revenue per
worker in domestically owned ﬁrms. When industries were divided ac-
cording to the size of the technology gap between foreign-owned and do-
mestically owned ﬁrms, there was a positive eﬀect of foreign presence in the
sectors with small gaps, much larger than that for all industries together.
However, there was a negative eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms, smaller, but statis-
tically signiﬁcant, in industries where the technology gap was large.
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to host countries by concluding that “such eﬀects exist and . . . they may be
substantial both within and between industries, but there is no strong evi-
dence on their exact nature and magnitude.” Furthermore, “the positive
eﬀects of FDI are likely to increase with the level of local capability and
competition.” Blomström, Kokko, and Globerman (2001), in a later review
of this literature, summarize the “limited evidence” for developed coun-
tries as pointing to a dependence of productivity spillovers on the absorp-
tive capacity of domestically owned ﬁrms. They conclude that small pro-
ductivity gaps encourage spillovers, while large gaps inhibit them. They
report similar ﬁndings among developing countries, and they attribute the
more mixed results on spillovers in studies of such countries to the greater
frequency of wide technology gaps between foreign and local ﬁrms (42–
43). They also report that spillovers are encouraged by vertical linkages
between MNCs and local ﬁrms, a characteristic that would also depend
partly on local ﬁrm capabilities.
Görg and Greenaway (2001) summarize the results of the productivity
studies with respect to spillovers from foreign-owned to domestically
owned ﬁrms by saying that “only limited evidence in support of positive
spillovers has been reported. Most work fails to ﬁnd positive spillovers,
with some even reporting negative spillovers, at the aggregate level” (23).
In contrast, Görg and Strobl (2000) take spillovers for granted in their
study of ﬁrm survival in Ireland, and ﬁnd that foreign presence reduces exit
by domestically owned ﬁrms, at least in high-tech industries, an eﬀect they
attribute to spillovers. Görg and Strobl (2002) ﬁnd also that foreign pres-
ence encourages entry by domestically owned ﬁrms. Görg and Greenaway
(2001) are inclined to attribute the variety of ﬁndings on spillovers mainly
to the diﬀerence between cross-section and panel data studies. However,
there is evidence that diﬀerences among ﬁrms in their capabilities, diﬀer-
ences among industries in their characteristics, and diﬀerences among
countries in both capabilities and policies may be important explanations
for this diversity of results. A more formal “meta-analysis” of spillover
ﬁndings from twenty-one studies by Görg and Strobl (2001), using the t-
statistic in spillover equations as the dependent variable, concluded that
the use of cross-section data was a strong positive inﬂuence. Of the eight
studies that used panel data, four found signiﬁcant negative spillovers, con-
ﬁrming the importance of the distinction between panel data and cross-
section results.
Since quite a few studies report that spillovers are discouraged by very
large gaps between foreign and domestic ﬁrms, by restrictive trade regimes,
or by other institutional factors, the composition of the sample of coun-
tries covered by the small collection of panel data may be important. Of the
four developing countries with panel data included by Görg and Strobl
(2001)—Colombia, India, Morocco, and Venezuela—none are listed as
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Bank (1987). India is called “strongly inward-oriented” and Colombia
“moderately inward-oriented,” and Morocco and Venezuela are not rated.
Of forty-two countries ranked by Wheeler and Mody (1992), Venezuela is
ranked in the next-to-lowest category with respect to openness. In World
Economic Forum (2002), Colombia, India, and Venezuela are in the lower
half of developing countries with respect to “Technology” and “Growth
Competitiveness.” Perhaps these are not of a random sample of developing
countries and are not the most likely ones in which to ﬁnd spillovers.
The studies of productivity comparisons between foreign-owned and
domestically owned ﬁrms and establishments have generally found that
foreign-owned entities had higher productivity. Almost all the studies
showed that some of the higher labor productivity in the foreign-owned en-
tities could be explained by their greater capital intensity, their larger size,
and their greater use of purchased inputs. The same variables, except for
the capital intensity (and sometimes the purchased inputs), accounted for
the diﬀerences in TFP. Even after these factors are removed from the com-
parison, it is frequently, but not always, found that there is a residual pro-
ductivity advantage for the foreign-owned ﬁrms. There is more logic to
removing the inﬂuence of these other factors in comparisons within
developed countries than in comparisons within developing countries. In
developed countries it can more easily be assumed that there are domestic
ﬁrms capable of producing with the same capital intensity and managing
plants of the same size. In developing countries, there may be a better case
for suggesting that the technological impact of the foreign ﬁrms is broader
than what is measured by their TFP. It also involves their knowledge of
how to produce on a large scale and market the output, how to use capital-
intensive techniques, and how to combine local inputs with purchased in-
puts from the multinational itself or other suppliers. If that is the case, one
should study diﬀerences and look for spillovers not only in TFP but also in
plant size, capital intensity, and use of other inputs.
An unusual study of spillovers to the host country that was focused di-
rectly on spillovers of knowledge, and did not depend on TFP measures at
all, was Branstetter’s (2000) examination of patent citations. The higher the
level of Japanese aﬃliates sales in the United States, lagged two years, the
larger the number of U.S. citations to Japanese patents in U.S.-ﬁrm patent
applications. A recent paper by Singh (2002), analyzing citations in U.S.
patent ﬁlings, ﬁnds evidence of knowledge ﬂows from local ﬁrms to multi-
nationals’ foreign aﬃliates and from the aﬃliates to local ﬁrms, and sum-
marizes other studies based on patent citations. This line of research is a
promising addition to studies of knowledge diﬀusion, bypassing the prob-
lems of productivity measurement.
Another suggestion that common measures of technology-transfer miss
the point was made in an analysis of the impact of inward FDI on China
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contribution in high technology transfer to China” (700), which it explains
by the high proportion of FDI coming from Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The impact of such investment was that it brought “the modern concept of
management and marketing” (700). That is a contribution that would be
missed by standard measures of TFP.
Productivity-spillover studies typically assume that the eﬀect on domes-
tic ﬁrms should be linearly or log-linearly dependent on the foreign share
of an industry. It is not obvious that this should be the case, particularly as
the foreign share goes to high levels. Spillover is not obviously maximized
at a foreign share of 100 percent. One way this problem is recognized is in
Kokko (1996), where industries with foreign shares above 50 percent are
dropped, being categorized as “enclave industries.”
A broader problem is that there is little basis for assuming any particu-
lar form of the relationship. Some mechanisms might suggest a linear rela-
tion to the foreign participation share, but others might suggest a strong
eﬀect from foreign entry, but little eﬀect from changes in share.
One of the few studies to examine productivity growth in general, rather
than only spillovers to domestic ﬁrms was a cross-country, cross-industry
study covering nine Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries from 1979 to 1991, by Baldwin, Braconier, and
Forslid (1999). They examined labor productivity growth in seven broad
industry aggregates. Although the title of the paper refers to spillovers, no
distinction was made between productivity in foreign-owned ﬁrms and
that in domestically owned ones. This does not match the usual deﬁnition
of spillovers, in which that distinction is important, but the results are of
interest because they measure the total impact on an industry, a topic
rarely studied. The authors reported that higher FDI penetration levels led
to more rapid growth in industry labor productivity.
Another of these rare attempts to measure eﬀects on industries as a
whole, rather than only on domestically owned ﬁrms, was an unpublished
paper by Nadiri (1992). He used U.S.-owned aﬃliates’ stocks of plant and
equipment, rather than ﬁnancial ﬂows, as the measure of foreign invest-
ment in the manufacturing sectors of four developed host countries:
France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. United States–owned
aﬃliates’ capital reduced the cost and price of output, and increased out-
put and TFP. The increase in output raised the demand for labor and ma-
terials, but the higher U.S. FDI capital reduced the demand for labor and
materials per unit of output.
As mentioned earlier, a serious problem with TFP measures, especially
in developing countries, is the weakness of the data on capital stocks. An-
other problem with productivity comparisons and productivity-spillover
measures is that it is extremely rare to ﬁnd any measure of output other
than value-added, or even any comparison with alternative measures. The
364 Robert E. Lipseyassumption underlying the measurement of output by value-added, which
is an input measure, is that the ﬁrm or establishment is operating in a com-
petitive environment. If a ﬁrm paid wages that exceeded worker productiv-
ity, for example, output would not be exaggerated because proﬁts would be
correspondingly reduced, and value-added would still represent output.
However, if a ﬁrm operated in a protected market because it was govern-
ment owned or because it sold to the government, or because it sold to its
parent, or because competition was limited in other ways, its value-added
output measure would be inﬂated. Similarly, a ﬁrm earning monopoly
proﬁts would appear to be highly productive even if wages were not in-
ﬂated, because value-added would be inﬂated. Thus, for example, if the
entry or growth of foreign-owned ﬁrms broke up a local-ﬁrm monopoly,
the decline in local-ﬁrm monopoly proﬁts would appear in the data dis-
guised as a decline in their productivity resulting from foreign entry.
While the technological superiority of foreign ﬁrms seems clear, as is ex-
pected on theoretical grounds, the evidence on spillovers is mixed. No uni-
versal relationships are evident. However, there is substantial evidence
from several countries that inward FDI has been most beneﬁcial to the pro-
ductivity of local ﬁrms where the local ﬁrms are not extremely far behind
the multinationals’ aﬃliates.
9.4.3 Exports and the Introduction of New Industries
One of the main contributions of inward direct investment in some cases
has been to introduce new industries to a country or drastically change the
composition of production. Lipsey (2000) describes the large role of U.S.
aﬃliates in the electronics industry in East Asia, especially in the early de-
velopment of the industry. The earliest data available show U.S. aﬃliates
accounting for three-quarters of exports in some cases, with the share de-
clining over time. Labor-intensive industries, such as food, textiles, and ap-
parel, declined, while the share of chemical and machinery industries in ex-
ports rose to more than half (163). Some of the country studies in Dobson
and Chia (1997) are summarized as showing that “[f]oreign ﬁrms . . . saw
aw ay to integrate these countries into worldwide networks of produc-
tion....  F o r eign ﬁrms supplied the technology and the links to other parts
of the production networks that completed the set of resources necessary
for the growth of these industries” (163).
In a set of country- and industry-speciﬁc case studies collected in Rhee
and Belot (1990), the authors refer in their summary to “the critical role of
transnational corporations (TNCs) in the transfer of technical, marketing,
managerial know-how to developing countries—a role more important
than the transfer of ﬁnancial resources associated with DFI [direct foreign
investment] by TNCs” (viii). The development of plywood manufacturing
and export in Indonesia in the 1980s was started by ﬁrms from Korea and
Taiwan. They had developed their skills when these countries replaced
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and managerial know-how through joint ventures” after the home coun-
tries lost their comparative advantage as their wages rose (Rhee and Belot
1990, 22–29). A military-uniform exporter from Zambia grew from a joint
venture with a German ﬁrm that originally was aimed at the domestic mar-
ket but could draw on export experience from the German parent when
selling locally became impractical (33–34). In Côte d’Ivoire, a joint venture
with a French company, experienced in marketing and technically skilled,
brought the country into the semiprocessed-cocoa market (39–40). The in-
gredients for expansion of Jamaican exports of garments to the United
States were provided by a joint venture with a Korean company that sup-
plied “eﬀective management, eﬀective training in advanced technology,
eﬃciency of operations, and marketing skills and channels” (42). Not all
the catalysts described in the report involved FDI, but quite a few of them
did, and the contribution they made seemed to have little to do with sup-
plying capital and much to do with technology and marketing knowledge.
Buckley, Clegg, and Wang (2002) found, for Chinese manufacturing in-
dustries in 1995, that a higher foreign share of capital in an industry in-
creased the development of new and high-tech products by domestically
owned ﬁrms, as well as their export intensities.
Since export data are available in much more detail than production data
in many countries, the development of new industries or subindustries or
of new varieties of products may be evident most clearly in the growth of
exports. Blomström (1990) describes the role of multinationals in shifting
production in developing countries toward tradable goods and, among
tradables, away from import substitution and toward export markets. The
role of access to parent networks in promoting exports by U.S. aﬃliates in
Asia is assessed in Lipsey (1998).
Ireland was an unusual example for Western Europe, in that it went from
being extremely hostile to inward investment until the late 1950s, to wel-
coming and even favoring it by tax and other policies. One could not have
predicted the current comparative advantage of Ireland from its compara-
tive advantage before inward investment was liberalized, which was that of
an agricultural country. The entrance of foreign ﬁrms, together with Ire-
land’s joining the European Union, transformed the economy into one
where foreign ﬁrms, exporting over 70 percent of their output, accounted
for two-thirds of manufacturing net output and almost half of manufac-
turing employment. In relatively high-tech industries, the foreign ﬁrms
were geared almost entirely to export markets (Ruane and Görg 1999, 
51–53).
Most of the studies of the eﬀects of FDI on host-country exports exam-
ine the behavior of the aﬃliates themselves, generally ﬁnding that they are
more export oriented than domestically owned ﬁrms. Sousa, Greenaway,
and Wakelin (2000) investigated whether the presence and activities of for-
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United Kingdom. Using a database of U.K.-owned manufacturing ﬁrms
from 1992 to 1996, they found that foreign ﬁrms’ R&D in the United King-
dom, their exporting, and their importance in U.K. production in an in-
dustry were all signiﬁcantly related to the probability that a domestic ﬁrm
in that industry would be an exporter. There were also some indications
that foreign ﬁrms’ activities raised the export propensities of domestically
owned ﬁrms. The only comparable study the authors cite is Aitken, Han-
son, and Harrison (1997), for manufacturing establishments in Mexico in
1986–1990. That study found that higher production by foreign-owned
ﬁrms in a sector, as well as greater export activity by those ﬁrms, increased
the likelihood that domestic ﬁrms would export.
A study of China’s aggregate trade and FDI relationships with individ-
ual partner countries (Liu, Wang, and Wei 2001) found, in causality tests,
that China’s imports from a country tended to precede inward FDI from
that country, and that inward FDI then preceded exports to the investing
country. The initial eﬀect of inward FDI from a country on China’s exports
to the source country was negative, but all the subsequent lagged terms
were positive and much larger, so that the net eﬀect of inward FDI was an
increase in Chinese exports to the investing country.
The positive inﬂuence of inward FDI on host-country exports seems
well established, whatever the mechanism. And the few studies of spillovers
of exporting from aﬃliates to domestic ﬁrms point in the same direction.
9.4.4 Host-Country Growth
One of the main reasons for examining productivity spillovers from for-
eign-owned to domestically owned ﬁrms is to understand the contribution
of inward FDI to host-country economic growth. If the higher productiv-
ity of the foreign ﬁrms was at the expense of lower productivity in domes-
tic ﬁrms, there might be no implications for aggregate output or growth.
There could be growth eﬀects without spillovers, just from the operations
of the foreign ﬁrms themselves, but that possibility is rarely explored, ex-
cept by implication in studies of the impact of the entrance or growth of
foreign ﬁrms on the output or growth of a country.
An optimistic appraisal of the impact of inward FDI was that of Romer
(1993a), who suggested that, for a developing country trying to keep up
with or gain on more advanced countries, the main obstacle was the gap in
knowledge or ideas rather than in physical capital. Much of that capital
was the human or organizational capital of multinational ﬁrms. For more
rapid growth, “one of the most important and easily implemented policies
is to give foreign ﬁrms an incentive to close the idea gap, to let them make
a proﬁt by doing so . . . by creating an economic environment that oﬀers an
adequate reward to multinational corporations when they bring ideas from
the rest of the world and put them to use with domestic resources” (548).
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studied is through comprehensive cross-country studies in which the rate
of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita is re-
lated to the stock or inﬂow of FDI. In general, the results of these studies
indicate that the size of inward FDI stocks or ﬂows, relative to GDP, is not
related in any consistent way to rates of growth. However, most studies ﬁnd
that among some subsets of the world’s countries, FDI, or FDI in combi-
nation with some other factors, is positively related to growth. Blomström,
Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) did ﬁnd that, among developing countries, from
1960 to 1985, ratios of FDI inﬂow to GDP in a ﬁve-year period were posi-
tively related to growth in the subsequent ﬁve-year period. However, when
the developing countries were divided between higher- and lower-income
countries, FDI promoted growth only in the higher-income countries.
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) found, among sixty-nine devel-
oping countries from 1970 to 1989, that FDI inﬂows, by themselves, only
marginally aﬀected growth; but that FDI interacted with the level of edu-
cation of a country’s labor force was a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence. That
relationship was conﬁrmed for FDI inﬂows in ﬁve-year periods and growth
in subsequent periods in Lipsey (2000).
An explanation for the variety of results was oﬀered by Bhagwati (1978),
who suggested that the growth eﬀects of inward FDI could be favorable or
unfavorable, depending on the incentives oﬀered by host-country trade
policies. The eﬃciency of FDI in promoting growth would be increased by
an export-promotion policy and decreased by an import-substitution pol-
icy. A test of this hypothesis by Balasubramanayam, Salisu, and Sapsford
(1996) persuaded the authors that in ten to eighteen export-promotion-
policy developing countries, higher inward FDI ﬂows were associated with
faster growth. No eﬀect was found in the remaining developing countries,
presumably following import-substitution trade policies. This idea that the
eﬀect of inward FDI on growth is enhanced by liberal trade and investment
policies in host countries is emphasized in Moran (2002, chap. 9).
A panel data study of aggregate country eﬀects, without industry dis-
tinctions (de Mello 1999), found that FDI inﬂows raised growth in both de-
veloped and developing countries. In developed countries, FDI inﬂows
raised TFP growth, but not ﬁxed investment, while in developing countries
it raised ﬁxed investment, but not TFP growth. An earlier survey of eleven
studies by de Mello (1997) found a majority reporting positive eﬀects of
FDI inﬂows on growth, and stronger eﬀects associated with greater open-
ness or export-promotion policies and with a higher level of development.
The inﬂuence on technological change, and particularly domestic factor
productivity, was in the same direction, but observed in fewer studies,
again varying with the same set of country characteristics.
An alternative explanation for the variety of experience with FDI is
oﬀered by Alfaro et al. (2002). They ﬁnd, in a regression analysis for the pe-
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opment, that the existence and extent of local ﬁnancial markets is an im-
portant determinant of the extent to which FDI aﬀects growth. That idea,
which they trace back to Goldsmith (1969), among others, is here based on
the proposition that in the absence or weakness of local ﬁnancial markets,
local ﬁrms are unable to take advantage of the various kinds of knowledge
that they gain from the presence of foreign ﬁrms.
A recent study including developed and developing countries by
Carkovic and Levine (2000) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of FDI inﬂows over
the whole period 1960–1995, and only irregularly signiﬁcant eﬀects in ﬁve-
year periods. They ﬁnd that none of the variables found in other studies
consistently determine the eﬀect of FDI on growth, although some are sig-
niﬁcant in some combinations of conditioning variables.
In a narrower group of countries (twenty-ﬁve Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean and former Soviet transition countries), Campos and Kinoshita
(2002, 22) ﬁnd that FDI “is a crucially important explanatory variable for
growth,” and that the ﬁnding survives “correcting for reverse causality,
endogeneity, and omitted variable bias.” They allege that FDI represents
more of a pure transfer of technology in these transition countries than in
most developing countries, because these countries were industrialized
and had relatively well-educated labor forces.
As with the studies of wage and productivity spillovers, but more so be-
cause most of those studies narrowly focus on manufacturing, the studies
of the eﬀects of FDI inﬂow on national economic growth are inconclusive.
Almost all ﬁnd positive eﬀects in some periods, or among some groups of
countries, in some speciﬁcations, but one cannot say from these studies
that there are universal eﬀects. There are circumstances, periods, and
countries where FDI seems to have little relation to growth, and others
where there seems to be a positive relation.
9.5 Conclusions
Among the early fears about the eﬀects of the growth of multinationals
on their home countries, the worry that they would cause exports from the
home country and aggregate employment to fall has mostly dissipated.
There is probably no universal relationship between outward investment
and home-country exports, and to the extent that any relationship is pres-
ent, outward FDI is more often found to promote exports than to compete
with them.
There are some indications that multinational operations have led to
a shift toward more capital-intensive and skill-intensive production in
the United States, as labor-intensive—and particularly unskilled-labor-
intensive—production has been allocated to aﬃliates in developing coun-
tries. The alternative to this shift may have been a shift to nonaﬃliated
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to have occurred in Sweden or Japan, so it cannot be considered a univer-
sal consequence of multinational operations.
One function that outward FDI seems to have played for home coun-
tries’ ﬁrms is that of preserving export markets for the ﬁrms even when
home-country economic changes such as exchange rate movements, in-
creases in costs, or other events threaten home-country ﬁrms’ competi-
tiveness. Examples of this defensive role of foreign aﬃliates can be found
for the United States, Japan, and Sweden.
Within host countries, it has been abundantly shown that foreign-owned
ﬁrms pay higher wages than domestically owned ﬁrms. Some, but not all,
of the higher wage levels can be associated with characteristics of the aﬃli-
ates, such as their size and capital intensity. Where it can be measured,
higher quality of labor also accounts for some, but again not all, of the
diﬀerence. Beyond that, there is some evidence that foreign-owned ﬁrms
pay a higher price for labor, in the sense of paying more for a worker of
given quality, but there are not many studies that include data on worker
characteristics.
Evidence on wage spillovers (i.e., eﬀects of foreign entry or participation
in an industry or region, or industry within a region) on the wages paid by
domestically owned ﬁrms, is sparse, and not conclusive as to direction.
However, there is more evidence that, whatever the extent and direction of
spillovers to domestically owned plants, the eﬀect of foreign ﬁrms’ pres-
ence is to raise the average level of wages. The eﬀect may come simply from
higher wages in the foreign-owned operations, even without any eﬀect on
locally owned ones. It might come from positive spillovers to locally owned
plants or from the eﬀects of the increased demand for labor, even if there
is no diﬀerence in wage levels between foreign-owned and domestically
owned plants.
Many wage studies, if they are based on individual ﬁrm or establishment
data, include controls for plant size and, where possible, for capital inten-
sity and other plant characteristics. They attempt in this way to learn
whether wage levels reﬂect these characteristics other than foreignness it-
self, since wage levels are, for example, almost always positively associated
with establishment or ﬁrm size. From a policymaker’s point of view, this
distillation of the eﬀects of pure foreignness may not be relevant. An ex-
pansion of foreign presence may be desirable because foreign ﬁrms bring
larger-scale, more capital-intensive, or more technically advanced meth-
ods of production. It does not matter that an identical domestic ﬁrm would
produce the same results, because there may not be any such ﬁrms, or they
may not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to make these same investments.
Even if foreign entry and larger foreign shares of production almost al-
ways raise wage levels, there are some host-country losers from their par-
ticipation. Small or ineﬃcient local ﬁrms may be forced to contract or
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ment of capital, but it is an explanation for some host-country opposition
to foreign multinationals.
Productivity comparisons between foreign-owned and domestically
owned ﬁrms or establishments almost always ﬁnd that the foreign-owned
ﬁrms have higher productivity levels. As with the wage comparisons, some
of the diﬀerences can be associated with the larger size of foreign-owned
plants or other plant characteristics.
Evidence on spillovers of superior foreign productivity to domestically
owned ﬁrms is mixed. Some observers conclude that there is substantial ev-
idence for positive spillovers and others see the evidence as inconclusive.
Even where no spillovers are found to all domestic ﬁrms as a group, they
are often found for subsets of domestic ﬁrms, particularly those not too far
behind the foreign ﬁrms technologically, or those in higher-technology in-
dustries. The mixed story for spillovers, combined with the strong evidence
for superior productivity in foreign-owned ﬁrms, suggests that overall pro-
ductivity is improved by the presence of foreign-owned operations.
In many of these productivity studies there has been a substantial eﬀort
to calculate TFP comparisons, rather than labor productivity compar-
isons, and to remove the inﬂuence of ﬁrm or establishment size. An eﬀort
is made, in eﬀect, to learn whether foreign and domestic ﬁrms are on diﬀer-
ent production functions. It is not always clear why it is so important to
measure the eﬀect of foreignness alone, untainted by diﬀerences in capital
intensity and size. Much of the growth of presently developed countries
came from increases in the scale of production and in its capital intensity.
The contribution of foreign ﬁrms may come partly by introducing larger-
scale or more capital-intensive methods of production, or diﬀerences in
technology may be inextricably tied to diﬀerences in scale and capital in-
tensity.
One frequent eﬀect of foreign entry is the introduction of new industries
or products to the host-country economy and the tighter linking of the host
country to the world trading system. The contribution of the foreign-
owned ﬁrms is mainly of knowledge, particularly knowledge of demand in
the world market, and knowledge about how the host country can ﬁnd a
place in the worldwide allocation of intermediate steps in the path of pro-
duction that can be geographically separated. By the development of new
(to the host country) products, inward direct investment is associated with
faster economic growth, although attempts to ﬁnd a consistent relation be-
tween the extent of FDI inﬂows and national economic growth do not pro-
duce strong and consistent relationships.
One issue that is missing from the discussion of eﬀects of FDI—a
strange omission from a literature dominated by economists—is the im-
pact on consumers. There could be eﬀects on home-country consumers
from imports of cheaper goods produced by foreign aﬃliates. There could
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goods and services sold locally and from the weakening of local-producer
monopoly positions. There have been analyses in the trade literature of
consumer gains from imports, but studies of host countries ignore the re-
lation of consumer prices to the presence or activities of foreign aﬃliates.
A proven association of FDI with more trade and faster economic
growth would not necessarily please critics of multinationals. Trade links
reduce the freedom of action of a country’s government domestically, if not
that of its people. Fast growth involves disruptions and the destruction of
the value of old techniques of production and old skills. Those who value
stability over economic progress will not be convinced of the worth of the
gifts brought by foreign involvement. That is especially true if the gains are
captured by small elements of the population or if no eﬀort is made to
soften the impact of the inevitable losses.
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Comment Vanessa Strauss Kahn
Robert Lipsey’s paper surveys the existing literature on foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) in an attempt to elucidate the eﬀects of multinational ac-
tivity on the home and host countries. Based on a comprehensive review of
mostly empirical papers, the paper summarizes the eﬀects of FDI on ex-
ports and factor demand in the home country and on wages, productivity,
and growth in the host country.
Robert Lipsey’s expertise in the ﬁeld of FDI and his extensive knowledge
of the literature show in the paper. I ﬁnd myself almost wholly in agreement
with the author, also partly, perhaps, because he so graciously took ac-
count of comments I had made on the ﬁrst draft of this paper. Hence, my
comments are few and mainly consist on suggestions for further develop-
ments.
First, I think that further distinctions could be made between cost-
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Vanessa Strauss-Kahn is assistant professor of economics at INSEAD.oriented FDI and FDI that aims at accessing a market. While I would
agree with Lipsey that such a distinction is not always straightforward,
some FDI activities clearly aim at reducing production costs by locating
plants abroad.1 In such cases, most of the local production is exported to
the multinational enterprise’s (MNE’s) parent in the home country or to a
third country for ﬁnal consumption. Distinguishing the type of FDI is im-
portant because the eﬀects of FDI on the home and the host countries may
diﬀer accordingly. If the internationalization of production follows coun-
tries’ comparative advantage, MNEs will tend to relocate plants of pro-
duction in which the home country is relatively less eﬃcient to foreign
countries. Such relocation of production may not have negative eﬀects on
average wages and employment levels in the home country. However, it
may have important distributional eﬀects among home-country workers,
because changes in labor demand likely aﬀect wages and employment of
the less-skilled workers more than their skilled counterparts.
I also believe that the paper should further distinguish FDI eﬀects on de-
veloped and developing countries. For instance, most studies concluded
that foreign-owned ﬁrms pay higher wages than their domestically owned
counterparts. Reducing worker turnover and attracting better workers
are worldwide explanations of such features. However, compensating for
home-biased preferences seems to be a consideration more speciﬁcally
adapted to inward FDI in a developed country. In developing countries
other explanations (e.g., closing wage gaps between the multinational en-
tities) may lead to this wage diﬀerential. Similarly, there is strong evidence
that foreign-owned plants have higher productivity than domestically
owned ones. The higher eﬃciency of foreign-owned ﬁrms in developing
countries is predictable, as foreign-owned plants are likely to use more cap-
ital and/or more advanced production and managerial organization tech-
niques. Two main reasons induce the higher productivity of foreign-owned
plants in developed countries. First, there may be a selection bias as ﬁrms
investing in multinational activities could likely be the most productive in
the ﬁrst place. Second, most FDI occurred through ownership consolida-
tion, which usually leads to higher eﬃciency through ﬁrms’ restructuring.
Empirical studies aiming at estimating the productivity of foreign-owned
ﬁrms relative to their domestically owned counterparts should hence con-
trol for eﬃciency gains from national ﬁrms’ consolidation. As mentioned
by Lipsey, one study by Harris and Robinson (2002) goes in that direction.
It concludes that plant turnover seems to involve relatively more produc-
tive plants. I would encourage further research on that issue.
More importantly, I believe that future empirical studies on multina-
tional activity and its eﬀects on home and host countries should make use
of micro-level data. For example, most empirical studies focusing on the
380 Robert E. Lipsey
1. For example, Intel’s decision to develop FDI in Costa Rica in 1996–1997.eﬀects of outward FDI on the home country concluded that exports and
production abroad were, for the most part, complementary. Such a result
is surprising, as standard theory of MNEs would assume both substitution
and complementarity eﬀects (see, e.g., Rob and Vettas 2003). Most studies,
however, analyze the relationship between FDI and one of the following
home-country variables: country exports, industry exports, or, in the best
cases, ﬁrms’ exports. While these results are important, they do not exclude
the possibility that substitution arises when one looks at more disaggre-
gated data levels. For example, if an MNE exports intermediate goods to
its foreign assembly line, it induces complementarity between exports and
foreign production at the industry or the ﬁrm level. However, at the prod-
uct level (i.e., the ﬁnal good), foreign production substitutes for exports.
Notably, Blonigen (2001) uses product-level data and ﬁnds substantial ev-
idence for both substitution and complementarity between foreign pro-
duction and exports.
Studying micro-level data could also improve the current knowledge on
the eﬀect of FDI on wages and employment. If the labor mix (skilled to un-
skilled workers) were similar across products, using disaggregated data
would not add signiﬁcance to ﬁrm-level or industry-level data. However, if
the labor mix varies across products with, say, a higher employment share
of skilled workers in the production of parts and components than in as-
sembly line, then increased FDI may have a signiﬁcant impact on wage dis-
persion. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) use detailed data on imported inputs
to assess the eﬀect of outsourcing on the relative wage of skilled to un-
skilled workers. They ﬁnd that outsourcing explains at least 15 percent of
the U.S. wage-premium increase (this number may reach 40 percent in cer-
tain speciﬁcations). Although their research does not focus on FDI per se,
as it also encompasses arm’s-length production, I believe that their analysis
sheds light on the eﬀects of FDI on wage dispersion. Similarly, and as men-
tioned in the paper, Head and Ries (2002) ﬁnd that aﬃliate employment
does not aﬀect the share of unskilled workers’ wage in the total wage bill in
the home country when they use industry-level data. In contrast, when they
use ﬁrm-level data, they ﬁnd that there is substitution between home and
foreign activities of the ﬁrms toward a lower share of unskilled workers’
wage in the total wage bill in the home country.
Should countries promote or discourage FDI, or leave it to market
forces? As Lipsey put it in the introduction of the paper, these are impor-
tant policy issues. They might be even more so for developing countries in
search of a high positive-growth path. While most of the literature has been
not conclusive as to the direction of wage and productivity spillovers, there
is strong evidence that FDI raises the average level of wages in the host
country and that foreign-owned ﬁrms have higher productivity levels than
domestically owned ones. Are these features convincing enough to support
costly FDI promotion policies (e.g., tax rebates or reduced tariﬀs on im-
Home- and Host-Country Eﬀects of FDI 381ports)? I believe that further research should focus on identifying the nec-
essary conditions for successful FDI. While there seems to be no clear-cut
answer for this question, one could attempt to deﬁne industries in which
technological spillovers are positive, and identify countries’ characteristics
that help enhance such spillovers (education is a likely candidate). Among
such sector-speciﬁc studies I believe that the issue of spillovers to suppliers
has received too little attention. Apart from two unpublished papers by
Aitken and Harrison (1991) and Smarzynska (2002), this area of research
indeed lacks evidence. Finally, it could be interesting to obtain some em-
pirical evidence on the potential eﬀect of inward FDI on host-country in-
dustrial agglomeration. More speciﬁcally, one could wonder whether the
establishment of foreign-owned ﬁrms in a country leads to industrial clus-
ters, by attracting upstream and downstream activities in that location.
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